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Murders involving knives and firearms never fail to grab the
headlines, yet they are relatively rare. Gun crime, for example,
represents only 0.4% of all recorded crime in England and
Wales. The public are often sceptical, however, when they read
figures such as this – and they have reason to be so. The
evidence collected for this report suggests that chaotic, street-
level firearms offences, often associated with young people,
have risen.
The research team, led by former Assistant Chief Constable Dr
Bob Golding, have built a report around primary research taken
from interviews and surveys with police constables and
sergeants, Youth Offending Team Managers, young offenders,
public polling and case studies in Manchester and Birmingham.
The report shows that the nature of the threat from gangs, guns
and knives is changing, and the Government must change its
approach if communities are to stem the tide of youth violence.
The research findings support four primary arguments: that
official crime figures do not reflect the experiences of many
communities in England and Wales; that information and
intelligence sharing between agencies is lacking; that early
intervention and prevention work needs to be targeted and
expanded and that the relevant legislation governing gun and
knife crime is a mess.
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Executive Summary
Murders involving knives and firearms,
such as the cases of the headteacher Philip
Lawrence, who was stabbed by a teenager
while trying to protect a pupil, or seven-
year-old Toni-Ann Byfield, shot in the
back by a drug dealer in a North London
bedsit, never fail to grab the headlines, yet
they are relatively rare. Gun crime, repre-
sents only 0.4% of all recorded crime in
England and Wales.1,2
The public are often sceptical, however,
when they read figures such as this – and
they have reason to be so. Official police
statistics and the annual British Crime
Survey do not offer a complete picture of
gun and knife crime because much of it –
especially violence between criminals and
offences by children under 16 – goes unre-
ported. Organisations that could provide
extra data to fill out the picture, such as the
Ministry of Defence or hospital A&E
departments, are often reluctant to do so.
And the Government sometimes uses
minor variations from one year to another
to present a misleading picture of an
improving situation. In other words, our
crime figures do not reflect the experiences
of many communities in England and
Wales. This conflict between official statis-
tics and public opinion forms the back-
drop to this report.
The authors, Dr Bob Golding, a former
assistant chief constable, and Jonathan
McClory – have worked from the point of
view of those closest to gun and knife
crime – the public and frontline workers.
They review the latest research on gangs
and the illegal use of firearms and also
draw on their own surveys of young
offenders; police constables and sergeants;
two detailed case studies consisting of
interviews with senior police officers;
managers of youth offending teams
(YOTs); and specially commissioned pub-
lic opinion polling. Secondary sources
taken from Youth Justice Board statistics,
Home Office and British Crime Survey
statistics and police strategy documents
supplement this material.
The incomplete official picture of
firearms crime and the timelag of up to
two years in publishing crime figures make
it difficult for the Government to identify
or respond promptly to emerging trends.
The evidence collected for this report sug-
gests that chaotic, street-level firearm
offences, often associated with young peo-
ple, have risen:
 Nearly three-quarters of police constables
and sergeants believe that gang crime has
become worse over the past five years;3
 More than half of young offenders feel
that the police are unable to protect
them from violent crime in their area
and eight out of ten of people in
Britain think violent youth crime is
worse now than it was five years ago;4
 More than half of young offenders have
had a gun or knife used against them or
been threatened with a gun or knife in
the past 12 months;5
 More than 1 in 4 of those surveyed
(27%) have either been the victim of a
violent crime committed by children or
young people, have had a gun or knife
used against them, have been threat-
ened with one or know a friend or rel-
ative who has had a gun or knife used
against them or who has been threat-
ened with one in the past 12 months;6
 1 in 5 people between the ages of 19
and 24 know a friend or family mem-
ber who has had a gun or knife used
against them or been threatened with a
gun or knife in the past year.7
This perceived rise in violence among
young people, frequently involving guns or
other weapons and not linked to financial
www.policyexchange.org.uk • 5
1 Hales G, Lewis C and
Silverstone D, Gun Crime: the
market in and use of illegal
firearms, Home Ofice Research
Study 298, 2006
2 Coleman C, Hird C and Povey
D, Violent Crime Overview,
homicide and gun crime 2004/5,
Home Office RDS, 2006
3 Policy Exchange polling
4 Policy Exchange polling
5 Policy Exchange polling
6 YouGov polling for Policy
Exchange
7 YouGov polling for Policy
Exchange
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motives, has drawn attention to changes in
the culture of gangs. These once stable
groupings that existed to protect illegal
commodities now seem to be more
volatile; their members younger and high-
ly territorial. There is anecdotal evidence
from gang members themselves that young
people in deprived areas deliberately join
criminal gangs for personal protection.
They want to be armed because they
believe that others are armed.
The authors agree with the Home
Office that the main threat from firearms
at gang and street level is presented by
legally purchased imitation and deactivat-
ed weapons that are then illegally convert-
ed to fire live ammunition. Some of these
firearms sell for as little as £50 and a sin-
gle firearm can circulate over many years
within and between criminal groups.
Although this trend has been apparent for
some time, the necessary amendments to
existing gun laws have not yet been put
into place.
Legislation is a mess. Laws governing
offensive weapons are derived from at least
six separate Acts, introduced piecemeal since
1968. There is no legal framework dealing
with knives and offensive weapons as a
whole, while wider measures such as the
Criminal Justice and the Anti-Social
Behaviour Acts 2003 also contain provisions
relating to firearms. Every new provision
inevitably increases the chance that the
police will make mistakes that result in a
failed prosecution – arresting a suspect under
the wrong section of an Act, for example.
Golding and McClory make more than
20 recommendations, divided into four
categories: information and funding; sup-
ply; demand; and law reform. These will
be developed and fully costed for the sec-
ond book in this series, to be published in
the autumn.
Going Ballistic
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1
Introduction
According to official figures gun crime is
rare, accounting for just 0.4% of all record-
ed crime in England and Wales.8 Indeed the
number of offences involving firearms fell
by 13% in 2006-07 compared to the previ-
ous year.9 The British Crime Survey reports
that knife crime is “stable”, though it adds
that “public perception is that incidents are
increasing”, and that “more young people
are now carrying knives due to fear of bully-
ing or attack, because of a perception that
all their peers carry knives”.10,11
It is against this backdrop of conflicting
official statistics and public opinion that
this report has been developed. We need to
set out three contextual issues before we
discuss our research findings and policy
recommendations.
Crime Statistics
The first is the challenge of quantifying
gun and knife crime. Sources of crime
figures range from official statistics (the
British Crime Survey and police recorded
crime), to less public sources (criminal
intelligence maintained by law enforce-
ment agencies). Published statistics need
to be interpreted with care: non-report-
ing and non-recording of incidents mean
that recorded crime figures do not and
cannot include all crimes committed.12
Changes in police recording practices –
notably to the counting rules in 1998
and the introduction of the national
crime recording standard in 2002 – have
led to artificial shifts in violent crime sta-
tistics.13,14
The British Crime Survey (BCS) also
has its limitations: it does not report vic-
timisation for under-16s, and assessing
criminality among young people is
intrinsically difficult. This has not
stopped the Home Office from using
BCS figures to argue that violent crime
has fallen.15
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8 Coleman C, Hird C and Povey
D, op cit
9 Home Office, Crime and vic-
tims: gun crime, Home Office,
2008; see www.homeoffice.gov.
uk/crime-victims/reducing-crime/
gun-crime/
10 Ibid
11 Home Office, “Memorandum
submitted to the Select
Committee on Home Affairs –
knife crime” House of
Commons: Hansard Archives
Research, 2007
12 Hayden C, Hales G, Lewis S
and Silverstone D, “Young men
convicted of firearms offencs in
England and Wales:an exploration
of family and educational oppor-
tunities for prevention", Policy
Studies, 29:2, 163 –178, 2008
13 Simmons J, Legg C and
Hoskins R, National Crime
Recording Standard (NCRS): an
analysis of the impact on
recorded crime. Part One: the
national picture, Home Office,
online report 2003; see
www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs
2/hors254.pdf
14 Coleman C, Hird C and
Povey D, op cit, p 12
15 Coleman C, Hird C and
Povey D, op cit, p 7
16 You Gov Polling for Policy
Exchange Polling
17 You Gov Polling for Policy
Exchange Polling
 More than 1 in 8 of those surveyed (13%) have been the victim of a violent crime committed by
children or young people, have had a gun or knife used against them, have been threatened with
a gun or knife in or know a friend or relative who has had a gun or knife used against them or
who has been threatened with a gun or knife in the past 12 months;16
 1 in 5 people between the ages of 18 and 24 know a friend or family member who has had a gun
or knife used against them or been threatened with a gun or knife in the past year;17
 83% of adults in the Great Britain feel that violent youth crime is a more serious problem now
than it was five years ago;
 85% of adults living in London feel that violent youth crime is a more serious problem now than
it was five years ago;
 88% of adults living in the northwest of England feel that violent youth crime is a more serious
problem now than it was five years ago.
Source: YouGov polling commission by Policy Exchange, June 2008"
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Conclusions based on recorded crime
figures and the BCS should be treated
with a great deal of caution. The forth-
coming research based on thousands of
interviews with young people by the
Centre for Criminal Justice Studies at
King’s College London demonstrates this
point in relation to the reality of youth
crime.18
The most recent statistics on firearms
offending show a long-term upward trend
over the past ten years with a fall over the
past two years. Firearms (excluding air
weapons) were reported to have been used
in 9,650 recorded crimes in 2006-07. This
was a 13% decrease on the previous year,
following a slight increase of 0.2% in
2004. The total number of firearm
offences (including air weapons) fell from
21,527 in 2005-06 to 18,489 in 2006-07,
or 14%.19 There were 2,517 offences
involving imitation weapons in 2006-07, a
23% reduction on the previous year, and
handgun offences decreased by 11% to
4,175.20
Figures for gun-related homicides and
attempted homicides are arguably more
reliably reported than other crimes. In
total, there were 750 in 1997-08 and
1,456 in 2004-05.21 After peaking they
fell but, at 818 for 2006-07, remain
above their pre-1998 level.22 A 2005
study found that the people interviewed
thought that while the most serious gun
crime appeared to be falling in the short
term, less serious incidents, such as street
robbery with a firearm, appeared to have
increased.23 Possible explanations are that
either people were more inclined to
report incidents, or there was an increase
in the use of “undischarged” firearms or
replicas.24
Murders involving knives or other
sharp instruments increased from 202 in
1997-08 to 258 in 2006-07, or 28%.25
Anecdotal evidence provided in the
Police Federation submission to the
Home Affairs Select Committee in 2007
backed this up: “The prevalence of knives
on the streets has undoubtedly increased
over the years. Police officers not only
have to assist victims of knife crime but
are all too often victims themselves: 28%
of police officers have been threatened by
a knife on at least one occasion in the last
two years.”26
Despite official pronouncements of
falling or stable gun and knife crime fig-
ures based on official statistics, the long-
term trend is upwards. There was a signifi-
cant rise in recorded gun crime offences
between 1997-08 and 2001-02, followed
by a reduced rate of increase and then a
slight fall in 2004-05.27 Overall, however,
recorded firearms offences nearly doubled
from 1997-08 to 2006-07, from 4,903 to
9,650.28 The Metropolitan Police submis-
sion to the Home Affairs Select
Committee in 2007 reported that knife
crime represents 1% of total crime in
London, or 1,000 offences a month, and
nearly 70 a year end in murder.
Going Ballistic
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18 Centre for Criminal Justice
Studies Youth Crime (forthcom-
ing 2008) cited in Leppard D
"Tougher laws and more cash
have no impact", Sunday Times,
18th May 2008
19 Kaiz P, "Homicides, recorded
crimes involving firearms", in
Povey D et al (eds), Homicides,
Firearm Offences and Intimate
Violence 2006/07
(Supplementary Volume 2 to
Crime in England and Wales
2006/07), 31 January 2008,
Home Office online report 03/08;
see www.homeoffice.gov.uk
/rds/pdfs08/hosb0308.pdf
20 Ibid
21 Hales G, Lewis C, Silverstone
D, Gun Crime: the market in and
use of illegal firearms, Home
Ofice Research Study 298, pp 3-
4, 2006
22 Kaiz P, op cit
23 Povey D and Kaiz P,
"Recorded Crimes Involving
Firearms", Chapter 2 in Povey D
et al, op cit, p 39
24 Interview with ACPO Criminal
Use of Firearms working group
representative, May 2008
25 Coleman C, Hird C and
Povey D, op cit
26 Police Federation,
"Memorandum submitted to the
Select Committee on Home
Affairs – knife crime", House of
Commons: Hansard Archives
Research, 2007
27 Hales, G, Lewis C,
Silverstone D, op cit, p 3
28 Kaiz P, op cit
 90% of adults over the age of 55 in Britain feel that violent youth crime is a more serious prob-
lem now than it was five years ago;
 86% of C2DE adults in Great Britain feel that violent youth crime is a more serious problem now than
it was five years ago;
 Nearly 1 in 5 adults aged 18 to 24 know a friend or relative who has had a gun or knife used
against them or who has been threatened with a gun or knife in the past 12 months;
 More than 1 in 7 (15%) adults living in London know a friend or relative who has had a gun or
knife used against them or who has been threatened with a gun or knife in the past 12 months.
Source: YouGov polling commission by Policy Exchange, June 2008"
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The capture, collation and submission
of gun crime data are far from satisfactory.
In a report on guns, community and the
police, HM Inspectorate of Constabulary
admitted that recommended procedures
for collating and collecting up-to-date sta-
tistics had not been put in place effective-
ly.29 Much data is collected at local police
force level but collated and published cen-
trally by the Home Office, leading to
duplication of work and long delays.30
Detailed crime statistics are available only
nine months after the end of the reporting
period and so the latest figures may be
two-and-a-half-years-old. Sound policy
cannot be developed on the basis of out-of-
date statistics and intelligence.
Senior police officers interviewed for
this study confirm that official statistics
do not corroborate the reality experienced
by communities and police forces in
England and Wales: many incidents go
unreported, especially gang crime and
attacks by criminals on other criminals,
where witnesses fear retribution or intim-
idation.31
Non-police agencies that collect infor-
mation that could be relevant to curbing
violent crime often fail to share it. These
include other law enforcement agencies,
schools and hospital accident & emergency
departments (if they treat patients with
knife wounds, for example).32 There may
be ethical or other reasons for this but,
given the limitations of recorded crime
data, improved data and intelligence shar-
ing between agencies is essential for better
informed policies.33
Given all these reasons to doubt the
accuracy, completeness and currency of the
available data caution is needed before
concluding from official figures that knife
or gun crime is stable or decreasing.34 The
long-term trends indicate the reverse is
true.
Performance Targets
The second contextual issue relates to how
gun and knife crime is reflected within the
centralised police performance targets.
These changed in April this year, when
Assessments of Community Safety
(APACS) replaced the Police Performance
Assessment Framework. The new targets
are intended to cover community safety
(including terrorism, violence and protec-
tive services) and shift the focus away from
reducing volume crime to tackling violent
crime and its causes.35
Specific knife and gun crime reduction
targets were conspicuously absent under
the previous framework, there being only a
general target to reduce all crime by 15%
from 2005 to 2008.36 Under the new tar-
gets it would be possible for the
www.policyexchange.org.uk • 9
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29 Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of
Constabulary, "Guns Community
and Police. HMIC thematic
inspection into the Criminal Use
of Firearms", Home Office, 2004
30 Interview with ACPO Criminal
Use of Firearms working group
representative, May 2008
31 Interview with ACPO Criminal
Use of Firearms working group
representative, May 2008
32 Interview with ACPO Criminal
Use of Firearms working group
representative, May 2008
33 Squires P, Gun Crime: A
review of evidence and policy,
Centre for Crime and Justice
Studies, London, 2008
34 Home Office, "Crime and vic-
tims: gun crime", 2008; see
www.homeoffice.gov.uk/crime-
victims/reducing-crime/gun-
crime/
35 Savage S and Golding R,
"Leadershipand Performance
Management" in Newburn T (ed)
Handbook of Policing (2nd edi-
tion) Willan Publishing, (forth-
coming 2008)
36 Home Office, "Memorandum
submitted to the Select
Committee on Home Affairs –
knife crime", House of
Commons: Hansard Archives
Research, 2007
“ A recommendation that deactivated firearms should be
classed as imitation firearms under the Violent Crime
Reduction Act 2007 is unlikely to be addressed until 2009”
 More than 1 in 10 Brits know a friend or relative who has had a gun or knife used against them
or who has been threatened with a gun or knife in the past 12 months;
 Almost 6 in 10 adults in Britain believe that carrying a weapon makes you more likely to be a
victim of violent crime;
 Only 2% of adults in Great Britain believe that carrying a weapon makes you less likely to be a
victim of violent crime;
 Only 32% of adults in Britain believe that carrying a weapon makes no difference on the likeli-
hood of being a victim of violent crime.
Source: YouGov polling commission by Policy Exchange, June 2008"
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Government to require local areas to take
action on pressing issues, such as knife and
gun crime, but this will depend upon the
availability of reliable information.
Legislation and Government Initiatives
The third contextual issue concerns the
Government’s approach to gun and knife
crime – both through legislation and its
strategy on violent crime. Chapters 2 and 3
provide an outline of legislative changes
introduced over the last 10 years in
response to gun and knife crime. Despite
its many reforms, the legal framework still
attracts criticism. Laws dealing with offen-
sive weapons are covered in six different
Acts.37 Criticisms of specific provisions
include the unclear definition of an offen-
sive weapon; the arbitrary legality of blades
that are three inches or under in length;
the failure to restrict the sale of certain
types tightly enough; and the failure to
keep pace with more sophisticated
weapons. The Police Federation believes
that offensive weapons legislation needs
modernisation.
Gun crime legislation suffers from simi-
lar anomalies. A recommendation that
deactivated firearms should be classed as
imitation firearms under the Violent
Crime Reduction Act 2007, or ownership
prohibited without a firearms certificate, is
unlikely to be addressed until 2009.38,39
The laws have been built up piecemeal,
with sections repealed and superseded.
Gaps remain in relation to deactivated,
imitation and replica weapons, and shot-
gun importation. The difficulty of dissem-
inating legal changes should not be under-
estimated either – 200 retailers were found
to be unaware of the new requirements for
imitation and replica firearms in the 2007
Act.40
The Government’s strategy for dealing
with gun and knife crime falls under the
umbrella of its violent crime action plan.41
A prime example is the brief Tackling
Gangs Action Programme (TGAP)
launched by the Prime Minister in 2007
after a series of high-profile cases involving
guns and gangs. It was applied in
Liverpool, Manchester, Birmingham and
London until early this year (the
Manchester programme, Operation
Xcalibre, is described later in this report).
Since then the Government has developed
a cross-departmental action plan for tack-
ling violence until 2011.42 A number of
recommendations are reportedly based on
existing best practice and include both
government-run and not-for-profit proj-
ects.43
Pre-existing work streams, from 2006,
of the ACPO criminal use of firearms
group – the national ballistics intelligence
system, and the national firearms intelli-
gence cell – are reflected as “actions” in the
Home Office violent crime action plan. It
states: “We will work with the police to
develop state of the art imaging technolo-
gy to provide information and intelligence
on firearms used in crime”. But this is an
initiative that had been developed over two
years before the publication of the strategy
and is due to go live in September 2008
regardless of the Government’s Violent
Crime Action Plan.
The strategy is managed by the Violent
Crime Unit based in the Home Office
and, although its detailed plans are still
being developed at the time of writing,
some broad conclusions can be drawn.
First, the Government intends to build on
existing work or work that is under way,
for example the lessons learned from tack-
ling gangs in four cities. Secondly, there is
an attempt to develop better co-ordina-
tion between agencies, building on best
practice, existing work programmes, poli-
cies and research. Thirdly, the range of ini-
tiatives is wider – from those supporting
intelligence, enforcement and control
(including legislation), to prevention
through education, national communica-
tion campaigns, interventions to change
Going Ballistic
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37 Police Federation,
"Memorandum submitted to the
Select Committee on Home
Affairs – knife crime", House of
Commons: Hansard Archives
Research, 2007
38 Interview with ACPO Criminal
Use of Firearms working group
representative, May 2008
39 Savage S and Golding R, op cit
40 Interview with ACPO Criminal
Use of Firearms working group
representative, May 2008
41 Home Office, "Crime and vic-
tims: gun crime", 2008; see
www.homeoffice.gov.uk/crime-
victims/reducing-crime/gun-
crime/
42 Ibid
43 Interview with ACPO Criminal
Use of Firearms working group
representative, May 2008
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behaviour of offenders and specific inter-
ventions targeted at rape and domestic
violence. It concludes that “it is worth
considering what is already known about
family and school based programmes that
focus on reducing violent and aggressive
behaviour as part of the response to the
growing problem”.44
Richard Garside, director of the Centre
for Crime and Justice Studies, believes that
success in tackling knife violence “will
require a concerted strategy to deal with
the causes of violence, of which the social
antagonism caused by poverty and
inequality are key.”45 It remains to be seen
whether the Government’s new strategy
will be sufficient to meet that test.
Primary Research
We gathered evidence from structured
interviews with managers of youth offend-
ing teams (YOTs), a survey of young
offenders, a survey of police constables and
sergeants, public polling and two case
studies built from interviews with senior
police officers. These primary sources were
supplemented with secondary material
from Youth Justice Board statistics, Home
Office and British Crime Survey statistics
and police strategy documents.
Police Federation Survey
In collaboration with the Police
Federation, the professional organisation
that represents constables, sergeants and
inspectors, we sent an online question-
naire to federation members in the
Nottinghamshire, Greater Manchester,
West Midlands, and Merseyside police
forces. The survey had a total of 1,231
responses between 7th March and 10th
April 2008.
The questionnaire was issued to all Basic
Command Units in the above forces, not
only the division responsible for policing
Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool or
Nottingham (the Metropolitan Police were
asked to participate but, citing time and
technological constraints, they declined).
The survey is a reflection of police experi-
ences of crime in forces with large metro-
politan areas in England and Wales and
not a reflection of national crime levels
throughout England and Wales.
Structured YOT Interviews
Building on the experience of police on the
frontline and on their perception of gun
and knife crime, we interviewed 23 YOTs
across England and Wales, with ten prede-
termined questions on perception of crime
trends, the service provided by the YOT
and how it could be better delivered.
Interviews were by telephone and each
lasted approximately 30 minutes.
Of the 23 that responded (15% of the
total), 13 were rural and 12 urban – a rep-
resentative cross-section ranging from
Islington to Bridge End. All were asked the
same questions, in the same manner; their
replies provided insights into how crime
trends vary in different regions.
Young Offenders’ Survey
At the end of each interview, the YOT
manager was asked if he or she would be
willing to distribute a questionnaire with
12 multiple choice questions to young
offenders referred to his or her YOT. The
questions were designed to find out how
often a young person may carry a weapon,
come in contact with one and have one
used against him. The survey also inquired
about young offenders’ attitudes towards
the police, their perceptions of safety and
their thoughts on crime trends in their area.
The responses for some questions paint a
worrying picture, while others seem to
reveal that the situation is not all bad. The
survey respondents had an average age of
15 years 6 months, and the majority (60%)
described themselves as white-British. The
youngest was 9 years old and the oldest 18.
Public Polling
In order to understand the perceptions of
www.policyexchange.org.uk • 11
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those at the frontline of enforcement and
prevention of violent crime we commis-
sioned a YouGov poll of a representative
sample of 2,000 British adults. It was car-
ried out in June 2008.
Case Studies
During April and May 2008, we visited
police forces in Manchester and
Birmingham and met police from senior
officers to constables, representatives of
crime and disorder reduction partnerships,
community leaders, police independent
advisory group members, police mediators
and people working with gangs. The case
studies were built around interviews, data
and strategy documents given to us.
Report Layout
This report consists of nine chapters.
After the introductory first chapter, the
second discusses the academic literature
on gun crime and the history of the legis-
lation that regulates firearms. Chapter 3
discusses the existing research on knife
crime and looks at how recent legislation
has approached the issue. The fourth
chapter examines the effects of gangs on
youth violence. It also sets out the public
health approach to prevention, which
treats violence involving weapons as a dis-
ease, in line with the World Health
Organisation’s classification of violence as
a pandemic.
The chapters on our primary research
look at violent crime from the perspectives
of police (chapter 5), YOT managers and
young offenders (chapter 6). Two case
studies from Manchester and Birmingham
follow in chapters 7 and 8; these highlight
best practice and the barriers to efficiency
that police still face. In the final chapter we
set out the recommendations that will be
developed further in the second of our
reports.
Going Ballistic
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2
Gun Crime:
Theory and Legislation
Summary
This chapter reviews the research on gun
crime and discusses how access to weapons
affects the nature of violent crime. We set
out the history of legislation governing
access to weapons and argue that a handful
of shocking events has had more influence
on the laws passed than carefully collected
empirical evidence.
Theory
More Guns, More Crime
One must tread carefully when working
through the existing research literature on
guns. Many authors on both sides of the
argument over gun control have pre-estab-
lished positions, and employ bespoke
research designs in order to support their
ideological beliefs. Although research on
the subject varies in scope and specificity,
the ultimate question that students of the
gun control debate are seeking to answer is:
what effect does the availability of guns
have on levels of crime?
Empirical work attempting to answer
this question typically takes one of two
approaches. In the first, researchers esti-
mate the effect that changes in the total
stock of guns have on national crime
rates.46,47 A more advanced approach evalu-
ates this relationship on different levels:
regional, state, county or city.48,49
Both approaches have produced mixed
results. The vast majority of studies report
that higher gun ownership rates result in
higher levels of violent crime, while a small
number of studies report the opposite effect.
These types of studies have important limi-
tations, evidenced in their conflicting find-
ings. Studies that use time-series analyses,
employing annual national level data, are
limited because of the small number of
observations they can use for estimating the
relationship between gun ownership and
crime.50 Similarly, studies looking at gun
ownership at local level and its effects on
violent crime suffer from a critical lack of
local gun ownership data (gun ownership
data for the US is available only at the
national level). Consequently, researchers
are forced to use crude proxies to estimate
levels of gun ownership on a local level.
In 2001, taking the above flaws into
account, Mark Duggan produced the most
comprehensive illustration to date of
American gun ownership’s effect on violent
crime levels.51 Duggan accurately measured
gun ownership on a state level using
National Rifle Association membership
data, sales of the magazine Guns & Ammo,
and the number of gun shows per capita.
Duggan’s research concludes that an
increase in the number of guns leads to a
substantial increase in the number of
homicides.52 His findings contradict the
results of research by Lott and Mustard,
who argue that American legislation allow-
ing people to carry concealed weapons led
to a significant decline in violent crime.53
Additional academic work has argued
that a greater availability of firearms will
lead to more crime, either by increasing the
likelihood that any crime will result in a
victim’s death,54 or by increasing the prob-
ability that a domestic dispute will result in
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the death of one or more of the individu-
als.55 In their work, Donohue and Levitt
developed a model in which firearms may
reduce the predictability of outcomes of
fights and consequently increase the num-
ber of violent confrontations that occur.56
The majority of academic research on
firearms legislation is concerned with the
effect of gun availability on crime, but there is
a lack of work on regulating the supply side of
firearms. For over ten years, firearms legisla-
tion in England and Wales has sought to
reduce the supply of firearms by banningmil-
itary-style weapons and handguns. However,
as statistics show, the police have had difficul-
ty clamping down on illegal markets that sup-
ply criminals with banned handguns.
As Cukier and Sidel point out in their
book, The Global Gun Epidemic, every ille-
gal handgun started out somewhere as
legal. Firearms commerce is composed of
transactions made in the primary (legal)
firearms market and in the largely unregu-
lated secondary firearms market.57
The importance of theft and the second-
ary market in supplying youths and crimi-
nals has been documented by three
American surveys:Wright and Rossi’s survey
of prisoners,58 the survey of state prisoners
reported by the Bureau of Justice Statistics,59
and Sheley and Wright’s 1995 survey of
youths in juvenile correctional institutions.60
Their broad findings reveal that offenders
acquire firearms both legally and illegally;
the majority acquire guns through theft,
family and friends or the black market.
Regulating incoming illegal firearms to
England and Wales is a time-consuming
and labour-intensive task, and anecdotal
evidence shows it is simply not working.
The supply side approach to reducing gun
crime seems futile if one accepts the com-
mon view that “guns are everywhere”.61
However, England and Wales is uniquely
positioned with very strong gun control
laws to stamp out firearms crime almost
completely. According to informal inter-
views carried out at a London pupil referral
unit, an illegal handgun can be purchased
for as little as £250 if it has been implicat-
ed in a previous homicide (ie is “dirty”).62
Efficient supply-side interventions
would help to make illegal guns more
expensive thereby increasing both the price
and hassle of making a connection and
buying an illegal firearm.63 Ultimately, they
would reduce the number of guns available
to criminals, and thus violent crime.
The bulk of research on gun crime con-
cludes that more guns do indeed mean
more crime, and that countries with high-
er gun ownership rates have higher rates of
homicide, injury and suicide involving
firearms. Previous work on the subject also
points to the benefits of supply-side inter-
vention and the promise of tighter firearm
regulation. In terms of legislation alone,
England and Wales has been prolific in its
pursuit of curbing the availability of
firearms, yet statistics from 1997 to 2007
show that legislation alone is not enough.
There is a strong appeal to supply-side
intervention, and police forces in several
areas have proved that if implemented well,
results are positive. However, gun crime in
Britain is too complicated a phenomenon to
be controlled simply by reducing the num-
ber of available guns. In the past, firearms
crime traditionally occurred in private
spaces, or in public spaces at times when
there were relatively few people out. They
were confined to a small number of profes-
sional criminals, usually having substantial
experience. These hired gunmen were a spe-
cialist breed seldom seen by the public.
Contemporary shootings have shattered
the traditional “rules” of gun crime.
Increasingly firearms are discharged in
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public space in broad daylight when the
general public are out of their homes. These
shootings are often perpetrated by 16-24
year-old men in a reckless fashion; in some
instances there is little to no provocation or
motive.64 Rather than firearms being used to
facilitate a specific crime (eg robbery),
shootings are now acts of vengeance or the
end result of an incident of perceived “disre-
spect”. The most recent shootings reflect tit-
for-tat reprisals and retaliation at the slight-
est provocation.65
As the brazenness of gang shootings has
escalated, they have attracted tabloid head-
lines and pushed the issue into the centre of
public attention. This has bred serious
doubts about the ability of public authorities
to manage violent crime and has made curb-
ing the problem paramount to public safety.
Firearms Legislation in England
and Wales
Firearms legislation was first consolidated in
the Firearms Act 1968. Although this remains
the principal law today, additional legislation
has been introduced in piecemeal fashion at
irregular intervals, either in response to
emerging threats or mass killings like those
occurring in Hungerford and Dunblane. Its
volume is considerable and not always easy to
decipher. For example, experts have difficul-
ties in deciding which weapons are “readily
convertible” under 1982 legislation. Firearms
law is also contained within general legisla-
tion, such as the Criminal Justice and the
Anti-Social Behaviour Acts 2003. While
acknowledging the size of such a project, there
seems to be a sound case for consolidating all
the existing firearms legislation into one all
encompassing Act, in the same way that the
1968 Act was introduced as a measure
designed to consolidate previous legislation.
Early firearms legislation
In the United States the right to carry a gun
is secured by the Second Amendment of the
Constitution. No such right exists in
England andWales: Britain has a long tradi-
tion of arms regulation. As far back as the
Game Act 1671 firearms have been regulat-
ed. The 1671 Act restricted ownership of
firearms and projectile weapons to owners
of large tracts of land and remained in force
until the beginning of the 19th century. The
Seizure of Arms Act 1820 empowered jus-
tices of the peace to confiscate arms from
citizens they considered “a danger to the
Public Peace”; however, the law did allow
for the use of firearms in self-defence.
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A modern legislative structure
The Pistols Act 1903 was a response to
technological advances in firearms, creat-
ing sensible gun control – the Act prohib-
ited the sale of pistols to minors and to
convicted felons. Additionally, the Act
required that non-home owners seeking to
buy a pistol had to purchase a 10 shilling
licence from the Post Office. In 1920 the
Firearms Control Act prohibited the carry-
ing of firearms for the express purpose of
self-defence and the “right” of citizens to
bear arms became a “privilege”.66 Strict
controls on handguns following the 1920
Act undoubtedly played a part in keeping
weapons out of the hands of those who
might have criminal intent, giving the
Government adequate leeway to deny
firearms ownership to high-risk people.67
Further technological advances led to
the Firearms Act 1937, which effectively
banned fully automatic weapons from pri-
vate ownership. About the same time, sim-
ilar legislation was upheld by the US
Supreme Court, signalling that certain
types of firearms needed to be banned
from the public domain.
The legal issue of firearms used in self-
defence was transformed in the first half of
the 20th century. In 1920, Home Office
policy allowed citizens to keep firearms in
their home for self-defence. By 1937, this
had begun to change unofficially, until
eventually it was no longer deemed accept-
able for people to rely on firearms for the
express purpose of self-defence. In 1954,
the right to a gun for self-defence was ter-
minated by a change in government policy.
From 1950 to the late 1960s gun crime
rose at an unprecedented rate: in the mid
1950s the proportion of robberies commit-
ted with firearms was about 14%; by 1969 it
had doubled. Likewise, the number of
firearms fatalities rose throughout the 1960s.
In response to increasing firearms
offences, Parliament passed three Acts on
gun control in relatively quick succession.
The Firearms Act 1965 established a num-
ber of new firearm offences and increased
the penalties for many existing offences.
The Act was also an attempt to address a
growing wave of concern that the impend-
ing abolition of the death penalty would
lead to an upsurge in violent crime.68
It is in the nature of firearms crime that
offenders will use what is most readily
available to them. The upsurge in firearms
crime in the 1960s reflected the wide avail-
ability of shotguns, which were usually
converted to the illegal sawn-off form.
After the shotgun murders of three police
constables, Parliament passed the Firearms
Act 1967, which extended the licensing
system to incorporate shotgun sales.
The following year the Government
sought to consolidate all existing legisla-
tion in the Firearms Act 1968. This
brought all existing gun legislation into
one single statute, which formed the legal
basis for British firearms control policy for
the next two decades.69
In 1973 a progressive and intelligent
Green Paper,The Control of Firearms in Great
Britain, laid out policy to rein in gun crime
further. It drew on empirical research show-
ing that the best way to reduce the availabili-
ty of guns to criminals is to reduce the total
number of guns in society, and argued that
society should make it as difficult as possible
for criminals to acquire firearms. Despite its
forward-thinking, no legislation followed
on from the consultative document.
Event-driven legislation
With the exception of the Firearms Act
1982, which imposed greater control over
imitation and readily convertible imitation
firearms, legislation in Britain has been
reactive, and driven by events.
Hungerford
On 19th August 1987, Michael Ryan, a
27-year-old “loner”, went on a rampage
near his home in Hungerford, shooting
dead 14 people and injuring a further 16.
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He was dressed in combat fatigues and car-
ried an AK-47 assault rifle, a carbine and a
Beretta semi-automatic handgun.70 His
random massacre had a threefold effect: it
precipitated government legislation;
changed public perception towards
firearms and the gun lobby; and led to
wider use of police weapon-carrying rapid
response vehicles (ARVs).
In the wake of Hungerford, the Govern-
ment rushed through the ill-conceived
Firearms (Amendment) Act 1988, which
banned military-style weapons and pump-
action shotguns and restricted a shotgun’s
breech or magazine capacity to two shots.71
The media’s focus on Ryan’s high-powered
assault rifle allowed the Government to
ignore the fact that most of his victims were
killed or wounded by his semi-automatic
handgun. The police were already aware of
the growing availability of shotguns and
argued that all higher-powered weapons
should be reviewed for stricter controls.
However, even though the Act drew heavily
on the 1973 Green Paper, the most pressing
issue – use of handguns – was glossed over.
The pro-gun lobby in Britain never
enjoyed the kind of support enjoyed by its
counterpart in the US, but it successfully
weathered the storm of Hungerford: rifles
and handguns went unchecked. However,
although the Firearms (Amendment) Act
1988 did not close the door on the pro-
gun lobby, after Hungerford public opin-
ion shifted permanently against the “shoot-
ing and conservation” lobby in Britain.
Dunblane
On 13th March 1996, lone gunman
Thomas Hamilton went on a shooting
spree in a primary school in Dunblane, in
Scotland, armed with four legally held
guns: two semi-automatic pistols and two
Smith and Wesson revolvers and 743
rounds of ammunition. He left 15 children
and two adults dead. John Major, the
Prime Minister, ordered a full judicial
inquiry and began cross-party talks on gun
control. Meanwhile many of the bereaved
parents of Dunblane formed the Snowdrop
Campaign, for a total ban on handguns,
and the media offered its full backing.
Seldom have the media and special interest
acted in concert so effectively. Because
Major insisted on considering the full
results of Lord Cullen’s inquiry before pass-
ing any new law, he was constantly out-
manoeuvred by the Opposition and the
groundswell of public opinion. In the end
he ignored Cullen’s recommendations and
the Firearms Act 1997 banned all hand-
guns over .22 calibre and prohibited small
calibre handguns outside licensed pistol
clubs.72 The Snowdrop Campaign called
this an “unacceptable compromise”. The
Government also introduced an amnesty
on illegal weapons, which led to the sur-
render of 22,000 guns.
In 1997, the new Labour Government
kept its manifesto promise and introduced
the Firearms (Amendment) Act 1997. The
legislation delivered what the public had
demanded in the wake of Dunblane: “an
Act to extend the class of prohibited
weapons under the Firearms Act 1968 to
include small calibre pistols”. At a stroke
“all firearms with a barrel less than 30 cen-
timetres or less than 60 centimetres in total
length” were prohibited. Nevertheless
firearms offences rose steadily, though
undramatically, in the next five years. The
number of homicides caused by firearms
increased by 63% and offences involving
injuries from firearms rose from 864 to
1,877 from 1997 to 2002.
Letitia Shakespeare and Charlene Ellis shootings
On New Year’s Eve 2002 gun crime
reclaimed the media spotlight when two
teenage girls – Letitia Shakespeare and
Charlene Ellis – died in the crossfire of a
shoot-out in Aston, in Birmingham.
In the aftermath, media pressure for
action to stem violent crime intensified.73
As well as extra provisions to the Anti-
Social Behaviour and Criminal Justice Acts
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2003, the Government organised another
gun amnesty which netted more than
45,000 illegal firearms – twice as many as
in 1996. The types of weapons surrendered
(the cache included rocket launchers, AK-
47s and hand grenades) revealed how seri-
ous and systemic the problem was.
The 2003 legislation led to three important
innovations:
 A mandatory five-year minimum sen-
tence for the illegal possession of a pro-
hibited firearm;74
 The creation of an offence for being in
possession of an imitation firearm or
air-gun in public;75
 The sale, manufacture and import of
guns containing gas cartridge systems
became illegal.76
These measures were added to the two
Acts as an afterthought; contrary to the
Government’s claims, legislation against
imitation firearms was weaker than in
other countries such as the Netherlands,
Sweden, France and Australia.
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Changes to gun laws since Dunblane Massacre, 1996
Firearms Act (Amendment) 1997 (pre-election)
 Banned most handguns: all handguns larger than .22 calibre banned (possession, carrying, buy-
ing, transferring);
 Exemptions: (i) slaughtering instruments, (ii) firearms used for human killing of animals, (iii)
shot pistols used for shooting vermin, (iv) Races at athletic meetings, i.e. starters pistols, (v) tro-
phies of war, (vi) firearms of historic interest. (Some airguns are exempt. Replicas and deactiva-
tions are not considered firearms and are not therefore covered by the legislation);
 National registry: required a central computer database of all certificate holders and all applicants;
 Increased police powers: granted police the power to revoke firearm or shotguns certificate if the
holder is a danger to public safety; and revoke or partially revoke a firearm certificate if the hold-
er is unfit to be entrusted with firearm (a shotgun certificate cannot be partially revoked);
Firearms Act (Amendment) 1997 (post election)
 Banned all handguns regardless of calibre, with exemptions as above;
Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003
 Banned certain airguns: added some airguns that use self-contained gas cartridge system to the
list of prohibited weapons, specifically targeting the Brocock model;
 Restrictions on carrying: extended the ban on carrying firearms in a public place without reason-
able excuse to cover imitation firearms;
 Age limits: increased minimum age for acquiring or possessing air weapons unsupervised from 14 to 17;
Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006
 Banned imitations: banned the manufacture and sale of realistic imitation firearms, with limited
exemptions for theatre, historical re-enactment, etc;
 Restrictions on air weapons: made it an offence for a person other than a registered dealer to sell
air weapons and required the transfer to be on a face-to-face basis;
 Age limits: raised minimum age for buying or hiring an airgun from 17 to 18 years;
 Further restrictions on firing airguns beyond premises, ammunition and generally stricter penalties.
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3
Knife Crime:
Theory and Legislation
Summary
Both knife-related homicide and overall
knife crime have been rising for the past ten
years. Our interviews with members of the
Police Federation, YOTs and young offend-
ers point to a trend of increased knife carry-
ing out of fear and/or the need for personal
protection. This chapter reviews existing
research that has explored the extent of the
problem, and the legislation introduced to
deal with it. As in the case of firearms, the
legislation is too complex and would bene-
fit from a single framework Act. So far
Government measures including tougher
laws, education, amnesties and increased
stop-and-search powers for police have had
little effect on the propensity of young peo-
ple to carry knives; it has not addressed the
underlying social roots of the problem.
Definitions
Knife crime is a term that is tossed around
in new policy initiatives and the media
almost daily. But it is not always clear what
actually constitutes knife crime or what is
meant when the term is mentioned. The
production of a knife during the course of
a crime, such as assault, robbery, sexual
assault, or homicide is indisputably knife
crime.77 However, there are instances when
a criminal act is committed while in pos-
session of a knife that is never produced.78
Measures of knife crime
The number of homicides caused by a
blade or sharp instrument is considerably
higher than the number of deaths caused
by firearms. The total number of deaths
slightly increased from 200 in 1997 to 212
in 2006 with a peak of 266 in 2002-03.
Last year, deaths linked to knife crime rose
by 18%, from 219 to 258.
The Home Office Offending, Crime
and Justice Survey of 2007 estimates that
at worst 60,000 young people aged 10 to
25 years, mostly male, may be stabbed
and injured in England and Wales a year,
or more than 160 victims a day.79 At best,
the figure may be as low as 22,000 each
year.80
Policymakers simply do not know how
prevalent knife crime really is. A series of
surveys by MORI for the Youth Justice
Board reveal a steady rise in the propor-
tion of youths carrying knives: in 2002,
20% of schoolchildren interviewed said
they had carried a knife at some point dur-
ing the previous 12 months; in 2005, it
was 32%.81
Children who are excluded from school
are more likely to carry a weapon than
those who are not. In 2004 MORI found
that 9% of children in school and 30% of
excluded children said they had carried a
flick knife; 5% of children in school and
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16% of excluded children had carried a
kitchen knife; 25% of school children and
46% of excluded children had carried a
penknife.82
Another study carried out by the Office
of Criminal Justice Statistics in the Home
Office researched the scale of knife carry-
ing in England and Wales through inter-
views with 5,000 people aged 10 to 25 liv-
ing in private households. The interviews
explored the level of involvement people
had with different aspects of criminal
behaviour. The survey found that 4% of all
respondents had carried a knife in the pre-
vious 12 months, and that carrying knives
was most common among 16 to 17 year
olds.83 An overwhelming majority (85%)
of respondents who admitted to carrying a
knife cited their reason for doing so as
“protection”. This is a very common
theme, especially among young offenders
who have been charged with a knife
offence. However, policy aimed at curbing
knife crime has yet to take this fact into
account.
Scale of the problem
The Home Office only began recording
knife crime separately from July 2008, so the
true scale of the problem is difficult to assess
at the time of writing. Moreover, the Youth
Justice Board and youth offender teams do
not record knife offences separately.
Data from the British Crime Survey,
based on the experiences of 40,000 people
each year, suggests that 8% of all violent
incidents involve knives, a rate that has
remained fixed for a decade or more,
while the percentage of homicides involv-
ing knives has fallen from a peak of 37%
in 1995. Of the 820 homicides in
England andWales in 2005, 236, or 29%,
were with a knife or other sharp instru-
ment.
However, knife crimes are four times
more common than gun crimes; and the risk
of serious injury is more than double that for
gun crime. The probability of serious injury
is 4.5 times more likely when a knife is used
to assist a crime. The risk of serious injury
from knife-enabled crimes is more than
twice that for gun-enabled crimes.
Attacks in which a knife was used in a
successful mugging have risen from 25,500
in 2005 to 64,000 in the year to April 2007.
The figures mean that last year there were,
on average, 175 robberies at knifepoint in
England andWales a day – up from 110 the
year before and from 69 in 2004-05.84
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Figure 2: Homicides by sharp instrument
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Perceptions that knife carrying has
increased are corroborated by at least two sta-
tistical sources. One is a Home Office study
published in 2004. It reported the findings of
interviews with adult arrestees, including self-
reported gang membership, and some of the
questions related to their use of weapons.The
proportion of past and present gangmembers
who reported carrying guns was similar.
However, current gang members were much
more likely to report carrying weapons more
generally and it is safe to assume that part
(and possibly a large part) of this increase
will have been accounted for by knives.
Usage, injuries and deaths from knives far
outstrip those from firearms, not least
because they are easier to acquire and, unlike
some firearms, do not require a licence.
The trends for knife crime seemed to run
in parallel with those for gun crime, suggest-
ing that they may in some way be linked.
Although many more individuals are
involved in knife crime than in gun crime,
some of them will be the same individuals;
and those who are involved in gun crime do
not start out carrying guns but other, more
readily available weapons, including knives.85
There is also a wide lack of reporting of
incidents of knife crime, as 51% of young
victims do not report the crime to the
police and 45% do not even tell their par-
ents.86 This is supported by other organisa-
tions: Merseyside Ambulance Service esti-
mates, for example, that 50% of stabbings
never get reported to the police.87
Knife crime and young people
In London, youths particularly between 17
and 20, are the most likely to be victims of
knife crime; 4% of 10 to 25 year-olds
admitted to carrying knives in 2005 and
1,226 under-18s were found guilty in
2007 of carrying a blade.
Also notable is the increase in violent
crimes committed by 15 and 16 year-olds.
According to a survey compiled by the Youth
Justice Board (YJB), violent offences com-
mitted by 16 year-olds rose from 17% in
2004 to 25% in 2005, while those perpetrat-
ed by 15 year-olds climbed from 20% to
26%. One in five of those convicted for pos-
sessing a knife were aged between 10 and 17
in 2006, according to HomeOffice statistics.
Related to this is the increased number
of young people arming themselves with
knives. The YJB survey reported a 12%
increase in the number of teenagers carry-
ing knives since 2002; the proportion of
girls carrying knives rose sharply from 15%
in 2004 to 21% in 2005.88
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Figure 3: Weapon carrying among gang members
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Over the past decade, the number of
convictions for carrying a knife has risen
from 3,360 in 1997 to 6,314 in 2006.Of
those convicted in 1997, 482 were
teenagers, in 200689 the figure nearly tre-
bled at 1,256.90 Worse, in surveys about
one in five teenagers admits to carrying a
knife.
David Wilson, professor of criminology
at Birmingham City University, believes
there are two reasons for youths carrying
knives. One is that it makes them “feel
grown up” or “manly”; the other is that they
are “scared”. Wilson says young people have
reacted to a world in which adults demonise
young people outside their own families –
“they are all chavs and hoodies” – and no
longer trust adults to protect them.91
Strategies designed to reduce
knife crime
Since 1997 it has been one of New Labour’s
most urgent priorities to cut “youth crime”,
but an audit of Labour’s youth justice poli-
cies, published by the Centre for Crime and
Justice Studies (CCJS) at King’s College
London in May 2008, concluded that they
have had “no measurable effect” on the rate
at which young people commit crimes. The
uncomfortable reality is that the Govern-
ment does not know how social or econom-
ic policy can be used to stop youngsters
committing crimes.92
Strategies that have been used to tackle
knife crime include:
 tougher legislation;
 reducing demand;
 education;
 amnesties;
 supply restrictions;
 stop and search by police.
Given the rapid development of a teenage
culture in which carrying a knife is seen as
normal, not to say essential, for self-
defence, it is understandable that there
have been calls to toughen the law. The
maximum jail sentence for knife carrying is
two years, or four years if the knife is taken
to school. But in 2006, only nine of the
6,314 people convicted of carrying a knife
were given the maximum sentence.93 (Of
course, the impact of tougher sentences
needs to be clearly communicated; knife
crime is most common among children
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Table 1: Proportion of young people claiming to have carried weapons in the
past year
Young people in school Excluded
young people
Base: all young people (4,715) (2,460) (2,225) (687) (502) (174)
% % % % % %
I have carried a weapon but never used it 21 31 11 47 52 31
I have used a weapon against another person 3 5 1 14 17 9
I have threatened another person with a 3 5 2 21 24 12
I have taken a weapon to school to 2 3 1 10 12 7
defend myself
I have taken a weapon to school to use 1 1 - 4 6 1
I have never used a weapon 62 47 78 24 17 46
against another pupil
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and young people who are less likely to
foresee the consequences of their actions
than adults and less likely to appreciate
cause and effect.)
The law governing offensive weapons is
derived from a number of Acts: the
Prevention of Crime Act 1953; the
Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act
1959; the Criminal Justice Act 1988; the
Offensive Weapons Act 1996; the Knives
Act 1997; and most recently, in May 2004,
amendments to the Criminal Justice Act
1988. Each was a response to a specific
problem rather than an attempt to con-
struct a legal framework that looked at the
threat posed by knives and offensive
weapons as a whole.94
The complexity of the law is a very
real difficulty for police officers. With
every new law the chance of mistakes
being made – for instance arresting a sus-
pect under the wrong section –
inevitably increases. In common with
the Police Federation we have concerns
regarding:95
 the unclear definition of offensive weap-
ons (the Prevention of Crime Act 1953);
 the arbitrary legality of three inch (or
less) knives and implements;
 the narrow definition of weapons for
which marketing is outlawed (the
Knives Act 1997);
 the law’s failure to keep pace with the
development of new, more sophisticat-
ed weapons such as gravity, lock, but-
terfly and disguised knives.
Reducing demand
In response to a number of high-profile
stabbings, ministers have resorted primari-
ly to criminal justice responses – in partic-
ular the various measures in the Violent
Crime Reduction Act 2006 – rather than
developing prevention strategies to address
the underlying social and economic roots
of violence.
Enver Solomon, deputy director of the
CCJS, says: “Since it’s extremely difficult if
not impossible to limit the availability of
knives, and knives are merely a tool used in
violent crime, success in fighting knife
crime will only come with success in deal-
ing with the underlying causes of violence,
fear and insecurity.”96
The Government has spent more than
£5 billion on its New Deal, which was
designed to reduce crime by reducing the
number of 16 to 19 year-olds “not in
employment, education or training”, or
NEETs. But the number of NEETs has
actually increased over the decade since the
New Deal was introduced.
The role of the family and good parent-
ing cannot be overstated in the drive for
prevention. Early engagement and support
for vulnerable families and individuals,
and information sharing between police
protective services and other agencies are
crucial to success. Faith-based and local
support networks provide a rich vein of
skilled people willing and able to help.
Police forces should identify local faith
leaders willing to assist and should encour-
age their support and involvement in
diversionary and preventive activity.97
Education
A Home Office report that considered pos-
sible approaches to reducing homicide
rates concluded that the most promising
weapons-related strategies were “educa-
tional campaigns regarding the dangers
and penalties in relation to the illegal car-
rying of knives and other weapons”.98
While the educational approach may
well be useful, few of the programmes
have been evaluated for their effectiveness.
The Be Safe project, which “goes into
schools to educate young people on the
harsh realities of what can happen when
they carry a knife”, states that it has been
evaluated by the Newham youth offend-
ing team and claims some impressive
results. The messenger is as important as
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the message. The “Respect your Life, not a
Knife” pledge wall campaign, backed by
the footballer Rio Ferdinand, understood
this. But more systematic assessment and
evaluation of educational projects are
needed.99
Amnesties
A national knife amnesty ran for five weeks
in 2006. Although a national knife
amnesty is a relatively rare event, there is
often a local amnesty running somewhere
in Britain.100
What little research there is suggests that
knife amnesties have a very limited impact
on crime levels. One retrospective study of
records in Strathclyde found that
Operation Blade, which ran for four weeks
in 1993, had no long-term beneficial
effect.101
Ian Johnston, who speaks on knife
crime for the Association of Chief Police
Officers, says of the latest amnesty: “It isn’t
really aimed at the hardened gangster,
who’s not going to be affected by the
advertising, but at people who could drift
into knife crime because of peer pressure or
because of some misguided feeling.”
Unsurprisingly, six weeks after the end of
the amnesty, knife offence levels have
returned to pre-amnesty levels.
Supply
Simply clamping down on the supply of
knives – such as the installation of metal
detectors at schools or equipping police
with mobile metal detectors – is not suffi-
cient to address the problem.
Focused policing: stop and search
A 2003 Home Office report noted that out
of 18,900 people stopped and searched in
2001-02 under Section 60 of the Public
Order Act 1994 (ie in “anticipation of vio-
lence”), 1,367 (7%) were found to be car-
rying an offensive or dangerous instrument
and, of these, 203 (14%) were arrested for
possession.102
In London, Operation Blunt 2,
launched on 14th May this year at a cost of
£0.5 million a week has targeted ten
London boroughs, using controversial
powers under Section 60 of the Public
Order Act to designate areas where anyone
can be stopped and searched. This “stop-
and-search blitz operation” led to more
than 200 arrests and 130 weapons seized in
only two weeks.
Legislation governing knife crime
Laws regulating the sale, purchase, carry-
ing and production of knives were first
introduced in the early 1950s. The
Prevention of Crime Act 1953 defined an
offensive weapon as “any article made or
adapted for use for causing injury to the
person, or intended by the person having
it with him for such use by him or by
some other person”. As the law stands
now, it is an offence to have an article
with a blade or a point in a public place
without good reason or lawful excuse,
with the exception of some knives that
are banned outright, such as a gravity
blade.
Giving teachers the right to search
pupils – previously they had to call in the
police if they suspected that a pupil was
carrying a sharp instrument – was an
important step in prevention at schools.
There is some argument about the effec-
tiveness of stiffer sentences, which are
found in the 2006 Act. David Wilson has
argued that “instead of dreaming up new
penalties for carrying knives, communities
that want to be safe from them – or indeed
guns for that matter – we would be far bet-
ter off investing in good schools, with well-
paid and qualified teachers, and in ensur-
ing that young people, especially young
men, feel valued and included and have
jobs and training when they leave
school.”103
Although the Government has toyed with
the idea of on-the-spot fines of £80 for any-
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one caught with a knife, nothing has come of
this proposal.104 The history of knife crime
legislation has failed to address the underly-
ing causes that encourage young people to
carry knives for protection and treats the
symptoms not the disease. It is also convolut-
ed, confusing and reactive. The Government
would do well to follow the pattern of the
Firearms Act 1997 and create an all encom-
passing Act focused solely on knife crime.
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Main legal provisions:
 Prevention of Crime Act 1953 makes possession of an offensive weapon in a public place an
arrestable offence (Section 24);
 Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959 creates an offence of trading in flick or gravity
knives;
 Criminal Justice Act 1988 makes possession of a bladed or pointed article in a public place an
arrestable offence (Section139) and school premises (Section 139a); provides power to stop and
search persons (Section 140);
 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (as amended by Knives Act 1997 and Crime and
Disorder Act 1998) allows senior police officers to authorise constables to stop and search per-
sons in a specific area, either where a serious public order problem is likely to arise, or for
offensive weapons or dangerous instruments. Failing to submit to a search is an arrestable
offence;
 The Knives Act 1997 introduces a range of anti-knife measures including unlawful marketing of
combat knives, publishing adverts for combat knives, and creates powers for entry, seizure, reten-
tion and forfeiture.
The Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006 was meant to consolidate existing legislation and alter knife
regulations by:
 Increasing the penalty for possession of a knife in a public place (Section 42);
 Prohibiting sale of knives and other weapons (Section 43);
 Raising the minimum age at which a young person can buy a knife, from 16 to 18 (Section 46);
 Reducing the threshold for a police constable to enter a school and search the premises and/or
people from “reasonable grounds for believing” to “reasonable grounds for suspecting” that
weapons are held (Section 45 and 48);
 Giving powers for members of further education staff to search students and staff in attendance
centres to search persons (Section 45 and 46);
 Creating a new offence of using another person to keep a weapon and including an aggravating fac-
tor in sentencing if the person involved is a child (Section 28).
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4
Gangs, Violent Crime
and Prevention
Summary
There is no shortage of literature on street
gangs in criminology, but the vast majority
of research is based on the American expe-
rience; there are many gaps in our knowl-
edge about street gang numbers and their
distribution in England and Wales.
However, the impact of gang activity on
levels of violent crime and youth offending
is inescapable. Gang members are more
likely than non-members to be involved in
violent crimes, carrying illegal weapons,
drugs, acts of criminal damage and general
disorder.105 Legislation is not sufficient to
control this surge in youth crime.
Prevention requires attention to sociologi-
cal and psychological factors as well as legal
controls.
Theory
The first large-scale work on gangs was
conducted by Robert Park and Frederick
Thrasher in Chicago.106,107 Because they
were primarily concerned with the impact
of migration on the ecology of the city and
the social disorganisation of migrant fami-
lies, they looked at gangs formed along
ethnic lines. Following these seminal stud-
ies, attention turned to the social and eco-
nomic conditions and criminal, political
and administrative structures that foster
the emergence of gangs.108
The standard academic definition of
gangs was established by the American
anthropologist, Walter Miller in the early
1980s: “A group of recurrently associating
individuals with identifiable leadership
and internal organisation, identifying with
or claiming control over territory in the
community, and engaging either individu-
ally or collectively in violent or other forms
of illegal behaviour.”109
While the definition of gangs is more
established in the American case, gang
research in England and Wales is still in a
developing stage. In their work,
Shropshire and McFarquhar make a dis-
tinction between two different types of
gang found in Britain. The first type,
“crime firms”, are distinguishable by the
fact that they are well organised and tied
together by common economic interests
and involved in illegal money making
opportunities. The second type, “street
gangs”, are marked by their disorganisa-
tion and a lack of clear hierarchy. These
gangs are not usually formed for econom-
ic benefit and are distributed along territo-
rial or ethnic lines. 
In their 2004 research, Hallsworth and
Young suggested a typology of urban col-
lectives.110
 Peer Group: a small, unorganised, tran-
sient grouping occupying the same
space with a common history. Crime is
not integral to its image;
 Gang: a relatively durable, predomi-
nantly street-based group of young
people for whom crime and violence is
an essential part of its identity;
 Organised Criminal Group: members
are professionally involved in crime for
personal gain operating almost exclu-
sively in the “grey” or illegal market-
place.
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Robert Gordon’s research into the
Canadian experience of gangs and youth
offenders added to the typology taking
into account the nature of social interac-
tion among young people:111
 Youth movements: social movements
characterised by a distinctive mode of
dress or other bodily adornments, a
leisure-time preference and other dis-
tinguishing features (eg punk rockers);
 Youth groups: small clusters who hang
out together in public places such as
shopping centres;
 Criminal groups: small clusters of
friends who band together, usually
briefly, to commit crime primarily for
financial gain, and may contain young
and not-so-young adults as well; 
 Wannabe groups: loosely structured
groups engaging in spontaneous social
activity and impulsive criminal activi-
ty including collective violence against
other groups of youths. Wannabees
will often claim territory and adopt
gang-style identifying markers of some
kind; 
 Street gangs: semi-structured organisa-
tions involved in planned and prof-
itable criminal behaviour or organised
violence against rival street gangs. They
tend to be less visible but more perma-
nent than other groups;
 Criminal business organisations: groups
with a formal structure and a high
degree of sophistication composed
mainly of adults who engage in crimi-
nal activity primarily for economic rea-
sons and almost invariably maintain a
low profile. Thus while they may have
a name, they are rarely visible. 
Research in the US, Canada and England
and Wales on classifying gangs reveals how
varied the phenomenon is. Any effective
policy aimed at curbing gang violence and
activity needs to take into account the
spectrum of gang organisation.  
Criminologists in Britain are beginning to
study the experience of gangs in England
and Wales, but research is still relatively
limited. A 2002 report commissioned by
Manchester City Council found that there
are approximately 1,000 young people in
gangs within Greater Manchester.112 One
nationwide estimate puts the number of
young people involved in a gang at
30,000.113 As the number of youths
involved in gangs has grown so has the
prevalence of weapons and firearms on the
streets. In 2002, the National Criminal
Intelligence Service (now the Serious and
Organised Crime Agency), reported an
increase in gun possession among gangs.114
Bullock and Tilley researched gang
involvement in Manchester using police
databases. They interviewed 23 males
identified by Manchester police as known
gang members. Their study found that the
large majority of gang members were
young, black and male; all were heavily
involved in criminal behaviour, each aver-
aging 12 arrests and 2.1 previous convic-
tions.115   They also noted the increasing use
of weapons among gang members. It is
important to note that Bullock and Tilley’s
observations are specific to Manchester.
Although gangs are a growing national
phenomenon, their ethnic make-up varies;
each local gang is unique.
In his ethnographic study of gang mem-
bers in Manchester from 1997 to 1998,
Dennis Mares captured the developmental
stages of two gangs discussed in Bullock
and Tilley’s research. Both gangs were
heavily involved in dealing class A drugs
within a very loosely organised hierarchy
without formal leaders.116 Further studies
confirm that this is typical: one study
found that three-quarters of gangs were
involved in some form of drug dealing and
that 60% allegedly possessed firearms.117
In 2004, Bennett and Holloway looked
at gang membership among offenders
using data from a programme that moni-
tors drug abuse among arrestees in
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England and Wales.118  They concluded
that gang members tend to be young
(under 25 years), male, criminally active,
often involved in robbery and drug supply
offences and have a tendency to carry
weapons and firearms.119 Comparisons
between gang members and non-gang
members were statistically significant and
showed that roughly two-thirds of current
gang members had taken a weapon to
commit an offence; more than half had
possessed a gun; and three-quarters said
they had mixed with people who possessed
guns.120 The majority of gang members in
England and Wales are white and the dom-
inant ethnic minority groups are
Caribbean and Bangladeshi; in America,
gang members are mostly African-
Americans. Although gang membership is
typically seen as being no longer than a
year or two, some believe that, as gang cul-
ture develops further, the number of older
gang members will grow.121,122
From his research into gangs in
Waltham Forest, in northeast London,
Professor John Pitts has produced one of
the most interesting and insightful of
recent papers on gangs. He breaks down
individual members of gangs into six cate-
gories:123
 core members/elders;
 soldiers/youngers;
 shooters/street-level drug dealers;
 wannabees/girlfriends;
 occasional (ambivalent) affiliates;
 reluctant gang members.
What is so striking about Pitts’s findings is
the concept of the “reluctant gangsters”,
which can be understood as youths living
in the territory of a gang who are effective-
ly forced into participation through social
pressure or even physical intimidation.
Pitts argues that the gang involvement of
about one third of young people in
Waltham Forest is not wholly voluntary.124
These reluctant members joined because of
the risks of harm to themselves or their
family if they did not; to oppose other
gangs; to get access to education/ recre-
ational resources in gang territory; to com-
pensate for lack of legitimate employment
or education opportunities. They did not
leave the gang because of the dangers
inherent in doing so. This is a bleak picture
for youths living in areas with active gangs.
If Pitts’s findings are more widely applica-
ble then the Government needs to take
them into account when tackling the
firearms and knife offences that are inextri-
cably linked with gangs in our large urban
centres. Instances of violent offending with
firearms and knives are inextricably linked
with gang culture in major urban centres
throughout Britain, and any attempt to
curb gun and knife crime must be integrat-
ed with policies that target gangs and gang
crime.
Prevention and the Public
Health Approach
Between 1985 and 1992 youth violence in
the US surged to unprecedented levels.
Judging by the ten-year rise in gun and
knife crime, England and Wales could be
at the beginning of a similar surge. The
question is – what would successful pre-
vention look like?
Over the past 30 years the academic
community has expressed growing uncer-
tainty about the role of legal sanctions in
the prevention of violence. In simple eco-
nomic terms, the effectiveness of criminal
deterrence is a function of the severity of
the penalty for a given offence and the like-
lihood of being punished for that offence.
Thus incredibly high penalties for crimes
could theoretically be meaningless if their
enforcement does not bring an adequate
rate of successful prosecution. But even
when the criminal justice system strikes an
appropriate balance between penalty and
risk of punishment, deterrence alone is not
enough to curb violent offending. 
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During the 1970s, academics realised
that criminal deterrence could not be man-
aged solely by the criminal justice system,
a sentiment shared by senior police officers
today. Since young people are most likely
to commit violent offences the focus of
prevention has shifted to the institutions
that wield influence over them: families,
schools, neighbourhoods and peer
groups.125  This thinking was the catalyst
for the public health approach to violence
prevention in the early 1990s. It is
summed up in the idea that “it is surely
better to prevent violence through the pos-
itive aim of promoting health than
through the negative aims of conviction
and punishment”.126 However, there has
been disagreement as to whether such an
approach is better than the straightforward
criminal justice system. 
James Gilligan has argued that the “crim-
inal justice and penal systems have been
based on one huge mistake: namely, the
belief that punishment deters, inhibits, or
prevents violence”. According to Gilligan,
emotion – namely overwhelming shame
and humiliation – is the primary factor
influencing violent behaviour. Factors that
influence a person’s ability to mitigate the
“pathogens” of shame, humiliation or lack
of self esteem include: education, positive
emotional development, external sources of
esteem from others (supportive fami-
ly/friends), wealth, and social status.
However, he has also admitted that it is
“likely that tough law-and-order measures
for crimes including guns have had a big
impact in reducing gun deaths”.127 Arguing
that one approach is better than the other is
counterproductive because any successful
effort to reduce violent crime will need to
extract the best from both. 
Public health studies have consistently
reported that laws that regulate safer stor-
age of firearms are linked to fewer deaths
and injuries from firearms. Preventive leg-
islation can be effective, but enforcement is
crucial if its full benefits are to be realised.
In one study, legislation requiring gun
owners to keep firearms locked away was
associated with reductions in accidental
deaths of children.128 Similarly, evaluations
of American laws at the state level that
restrict handgun purchases have been fol-
lowed by reductions in violent offences.129
In studies that control for income
inequality and social/educational exclu-
sion, the most important factor in deter-
mining a person’s resistance to violent
behaviour is early childhood development.
Farrington has identified the risk factors
associated with the subsequent develop-
ment of juvenile delinquency and violence.
These factors include: early childbearing,
low intelligence/poor educational achieve-
ment, erratic or harsh parental discipline,
parental conflict or separation, low socio-
economic status, delinquent or violent
peers and disorganised neighbourhoods.130
Essentially, the public health approach
identifies the above risk factors and their
subsequent effect on violent behaviour. Now
the field of study moves toward the discus-
sion of prevention: given the risk factors, can
the Government prevent violent crime?
Howell and Hawkins argue that there
are two distinguishable groups of young
offenders who commit crime. The first
group, persistent offenders, encompasses
those who show violent and oppositional
behaviour in childhood which persists into
adulthood.131 The second group engages in
violent acts only during adolescence.132
While many in the first group will be
impervious to prevention and intervention
programmes, the second group, and a
limited number in the first, could benefit
immensely from prevention work. 
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Kellermann evaluated a number of
schemes designed to prevent violent
offending. They fell into three broad cate-
gories: family and early childhood inter-
ventions, youth and adolescent interven-
tions and community level interventions.
Of the three, the most promising was fam-
ily and early childhood interventions.
Community level interventions showed
some promise, while youth and adolescent
interventions produced mixed results. 
He concludes that there is little evidence
that intervention strategies targeted at
juvenile offenders reduce violent offend-
ing, while incarcerating them is both
expensive and yields only temporary bene-
fits.133 The older they are the less effective
intervention is. By the time an adolescent
offender is referred  to an intervention pro-
gramme by a court, he is likely to have a
long history of antisocial interaction with
parents, schools, and community that is
not easily reversed.134 Other research has
echoed this, arguing that only early child-
hood intervention can yield maximum and
sustained impact.135
“Quick fix” approaches are unlikely to
have enduring effects in preventing vio-
lence.136 Unfortunately, expedient legislation
has been a mainstay of the Government’s
approach to knife crime. Effective preven-
tion programmes that aim to change com-
munities for the better must be guided by
analyses of both the most noxious risk fac-
tors and the existing strengths of the com-
munity.137 Both early childhood and
community level programmes must have
long-term focus, as short, piecemeal efforts
will not lead to sustainable results.138
At present, the Government’s best
approach to early childhood intervention
among disadvantaged children is Sure Start,
a programme aimed at raising the physical,
social, emotional and intellectual well-being
of children under four through joined-up
public services. It is  part of the
Government’s policy to prevent social exclu-
sion, and is designed to improve the “equal-
ity of opportunities” for younger children
through better access to early education,
health services for children and parents,
family support and advice on nurturing.139
Unfortunately it has lost some of its original
focus as the Government has expanded and
shifted the goals of the programme. 
The public health and prevention
approaches have much to teach policymak-
ers, especially at the local level. Councils,
police forces, crime and disorder reduction
partnerships, schools, primary care trusts,
and youth services must work in concert
within the framework of prevention
research. Dave Keller, Chief Super intendent
of Metropolitan BCU in Manchester, said:
“the police are only 10-15% of the solution
to reducing violent crime.”140 Violent crime
involves many agencies other than the
police. The supply of, and demand for, guns
and knives can only be reduced if the deep-
er social and psychological factors are
addressed alongside legal controls and tradi-
tional deterrence.
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5
Police
Federation Survey
Summary
Successful delivery depends on the people
closest to the consumer, in the case of the
police service these are the men and women
in local BCUs. Our survey of Police
Federation members revealed that those in
metropolitan areas felt that knife crime has
become worse.  Moreover, the majority felt
that gang offending has increased in their
area. They also reported failure to enforce
mandatory sentences, and to disseminate
information and training when new legisla-
tion is introduced. Their most popular solu-
tions were increasing police stop-and-search
powers and the number of officers armed
with non-lethal weapons. 
Professional Perceptions
Despite some of the most restrictive
firearms laws in the world, firearms crime
has been increasing in England and Wales,
most of it committed with an illegal or
stolen firearm.141 There is more violent gun
and knife crime in generally poorer areas
than in wealthier ones. 
The constables and sergeants who run
neighbourhood police teams are the most
knowledgeable about the state of public
safety on their beat. Despite the unique
insights they can offer, criminological
research tends to rely on aggregate crime
figures such as the BCS and official record-
ed crime statistics. Although the pioneers
of British criminology focused on the
policeman in the community,142 more
recent research has focused on the top-tiers
of the Home Office.143
In his study of municipal policies in
American cities, Lipsky concluded that
policy implementation depends on the
people who actually deliver it at the level
closest to consumers. He termed them
“street-level bureaucrats”.144  Although this
has been accepted in America and other
countries,145 the British debate has tended
to overlook this crucial aspect of delivery.146
To redress the balance, this chapter analy-
ses the perspectives of police constables
and sergeants – the street-level bureaucrats
– on violent crime.
Because perceptions of those at the
frontline of service delivery matter, the
findings in this chapter should be duly
noted by policymakers. All policy formula-
tion should be based on objective knowl-
edge and in the true spirit of the term, evi-
dence-based. Any assessment of crime –
and its reduction – must take the street-
level bureaucrat as its point of departure. 
Levels of Crime: The True Picture?
The BCS and official police recorded sta-
tistics do not offer a complete picture of
violent crime, because much of it goes
unreported – especially violence between
criminals. Given those limitations, our sur-
vey draws on the experience of those clos-
est to violent crime in the police forces
where it is most prevalent. Current Home
Office figures report that gun crime is
decreasing from a peak reached in 2002-03.
However, this official trend is at odds with
police perceptions in those areas most
affected by gun crime. When presented
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with the statement: “Gun crime is more of
a problem in my BCU than it was five
years ago”, 70% agreed or strongly agreed
with the assessment. 
The BCS reports that knife-enabled
crime was stable from 2005/06 to
2006/07.147 However, these statistics are at
odds with the perceptions of those at the
frontline of delivery. Presented with the
statement: “Knife crime is more of a prob-
lem in my BCU than it was five years ago”,
44% of respondents agreed, and 39%
agreed strongly. Only 7% disagreed and less
than 1% (0.8) strongly disagreed.
Regardless of what official statistics may
report, more than 80% of frontline officers
in four forces felt that knife crime is getting
worse. 
The survey asked about the frequency
with which officers are called to the scene of
crime where an offensive weapon is believed
to be present. 42% of officers were called to
a knife incident at least once a week and 9%
once a day. Only 14% of officers – mostly
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Figure 4: “Gun crime is more of a problem in my BCU than it was five years ago”
Figure 5: “Knife crime is more of a problem in my BCU than it was five years ago”
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those serving in rural BCUs – had never
been called out to an incident “understood
to involve a knife”. The table shows that
more than half of the officers responding to
the survey are called to a knife incident at
least once a week. 
As one would expect, the figures are
somewhat lower for gun than for knife
incidents. The survey found that 64% of
officers were called out to a firearms inci-
dent at least once a month, compared to
77% for knife incidents; nevertheless 28%
were called out at least once a week to a
firearms incident. While lower than that
for knife incidents, this figure still indicates
that gun crime is experienced with some
frequency by the average police officer. 
Asked if “gang related crime is more of
a problem in their BCU than it was five
years ago”, the vast majority of officers
reported that it was: 74% of police con-
stables and sergeants agreed that it was
and 33% strongly agreed. This is more
than double the number of officers who
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Figure 6: How often are you called to an incident understood to involve a knife?
Figure 7: How often are you called to an incident understood to involve a firearm?
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disagree or strongly disagree with the
statement. Among the forces that have
metropolitan areas, there is no doubt
among frontline officers that gang crime is
getting worse. 
Enforcement: Talk is Cheap
Without implementation and delivery all
public policy making is void. If the
Government cannot deliver public servic-
es and enforce the law as it is written, its
decision making is without consequence.
Combining the results of this survey with
anecdotal evidence, new legislation is just
that – hollow as a result of failure to
deliver. What research on the subject has
been conducted has concluded over-
whelmingly that implementing policies
from the top down is often problematic.148
This was the rationale for investigating
the perceptions and experience of the
“street-level bureaucrats” of crime and
justice. 
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Figure 9: Have you received sufficient information and training on the
enforcement of recent legislation?
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To implement policy those at the street-
level must be fully informed of new legisla-
tion and initiatives and the full impact
they have on service delivery. Without
detailed instructions it is impossible for
police constables (PCs) to carry out the
tasks expected of them. Based on our sur-
vey findings, there is reason to believe that
PCs are not receiving adequate instruc-
tions and the training on how to deliver
and enforce newly established government
policies on gun and knife crime. 
When asked, “Have you received suffi-
cient information and training in enforce-
ment of recent legislation (eg banning imi-
tation weapons)?” survey respondents
overwhelmingly replied no. Only 12% of
officers in the four police forces said that
they had received adequate information
and training about new policies. The vast
majority, 83%, felt that they had not. 
Where the blame rests for the above
results is unclear. It would be easy to blame
senior officers for this failure to communi-
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Figure 10: Do you think mandatory sentences are being enforced as they
should be?
Figure 11: Do you think enough is known about the drivers behind gun
crime to implement policy against it?
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cate instructions to the frontline staff, but
this might be rash condemnation of senior
police officers. One could point to police
authorities for not outlining local priorities
and suggesting changes to legislation.
However, police authorities comprise local
council members, independent appointees
and magistrates and are not responsible for
policy at the parliamentary level. The Home
Office must bear some of the blame, as cen-
tral policy should disseminate downwards
from it. For example, it issued very few
instructions as to how the Anti-Social
Behaviour Act 2003 should be implement-
ed – indeed, there is only one reference to
guns in an explanatory companion docu-
ment to an Act that was billed as a major
initiative against gun crime.149 Moreover,
there are a number of lines of communica-
tion that could have failed, leaving frontline
officers without adequate guidance on how
new policy should affect their day-to-day
work. This is an issue that requires urgent
attention. 
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Figure 12: Do you think enough is known about the drivers behind knife
crime to implement policy against it?
Figure 13: Do you think more police officers should be armed?
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Police officers also felt that mandatory
sentences for gun and knife crime are not
being enforced as they should be. In fact,
less than 3% of respondents felt that sen-
tences are being enforced as they should be.
And an overwhelming 85% of responding
officers felt that mandatory sentences are
simply not carried out the way they should
be. According to interviews with senior
police officers, the current average sentence
served for an illegal firearms possession is
approximately two years.150
There are arguments against the
enforcement of mandatory sentences,
above all the importance of maintaining
judicial independence. Mandatory sen-
tencing is believed to have affected the
behaviour of senior gang members. A
defence attorney turned local councillor in
a London borough has said that they will
pressure younger members into looking
after their firearms in an effort to avoid
mandatory sentencing. As a result, the age
of offenders prosecuted for carrying
firearms has dropped.151
As with the failure to enforce mandatory
sentencing, there is a strong perception that
other recent legislative measures are not
having an impact on gun or knife crime.
An overwhelming 92% of survey respon-
dents felt that new laws such as the Violent
Crime Reduction Act 2006 have had no
impact on lowering gun crime. There could
be a number of reasons for police percep-
tion regarding new legislation. Because of
the event driven and reactive nature of
much recent legislation, police officers may,
perhaps, have grown cynical. 
“Tough on crime and tough on the
causes of crime” was Tony Blair’s mantra as
leader of the Opposition. It followed from
this that new Labour should have a long-
term strategy that fights inequality and the
root causes of violent crime and is based on
the best available evidence.
However, the apparent lack of knowl-
edge surrounding knife crime and the
upward trend in firearms crime suggest that
Government has not delivered on its core
promise. To gauge police perception on the
causes of violent crime, the survey asked:
“Do you think enough is known about the
causes behind gun crime to implement
effective policy against it?” The response
was disappointing: less than 15% of police
officers answered yes; 65% felt that not
enough was known about the causes
behind gun crime and 20% did not know
if enough was known about the causes of
gun crime to implement effective policy. 
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Figure 14: What policy solution would be most effective in curbing gun and
knife crime?
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A similar question was asked about knife
crime. Only 16% said “yes” to the question
“Do you think enough is known about the
causes behind knife crime to implement
effective policy against it?”. The remaining
84% felt that there was either not enough
known (64%) or that they did not know
enough to answer (20%). Their replies
echo the attitudes of academics and policy-
makers. The most comprehensive research
on the British experience of knife crime
argues that there is a large gap in under-
standing on the issue. And the
Government’s “everything but the kitchen
sink” approach has not yielded results.
This gap must be addressed before the
Government can legislate effectively on
knife crime.  
The final part of the survey asked police
officers about possible solutions, including
whether more officers should be armed. In
the past the Police Federation has called for
more armed officers to provide the public
and non-armed constables with protection
should the need arise.152
However, there is no political will to
transform the entire police service into a
fully armed body. Police Federation
members have consistently voted against
arming all warranted officers. The argu-
ment is that armed police officers would
forever break the link with the commu-
nity. Guns would create a new relation-
ship with the public and would funda-
mentally alter the “policing by consent”
model that Britain prides itself on.
However, increasing the number of
armed officers would offer a balance
between greater protection of the public
and police, while maintaining the her-
itage of British policing. As the view of
the police officers surveyed demon-
strates, there is majority support for
increasing the number of armed police
officers: 58% respondents agreed that
“more Police Officers should be armed”.
Only 28 felt that there should not be
more armed officers. 
When taken together with other find-
ings – especially the perception that knife
and gun crime has risen in a majority of
BCUs – the support for more armed police
officers is a clear sign that PCs are frustrat-
ed with the current situation and that they
want more effective alternatives. 
The survey asked about other possible
policy solutions to combat gun and knife
crime. The table below gives the responses
to the question “What policy solution
would be effective in curbing gun and
knife crime?”. Respondents were allowed
to select multiple options. The most popu-
lar remedy was increased stop-and-search
powers – supported by 71%. The second
most popular remedy was identification
and intervention of at-risk youths – sup-
ported by 56%. The latter shows that PCs
support intelligence-led policing and early
intervention programmes, which show
promise for reducing the demand side of
gun and knife crime. 
In interviews with senior police officers,
we were repeatedly told that the police
service is never the first – and often the last
– to be made aware that a youth is at risk
of violent or gang crime. Many are not sat-
isfied with the level of early identification
and intervention with youths. We believe
that better early intervention programmes
are crucial to the long-term reduction of
violent crime. 
In this same vein, better intelligence
sharing and improved early intervention
are possible with the improvement of
multi-agency co-operation. However, this
recommendation was favoured by only
36% of respondents. Perhaps this indicates
that the ideal of joined-up government is
not quite as popular at street-level as it is in
Whitehall and Westminster, though more
senior police officers seem to advocate the
policy.
Another issue that is often cited by
police commanders is the level of co-oper-
ation between police and schools. The two
could undoubtedly work together better,
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but Police Federation members did not
think that more officers in schools would
make much difference: only 27% support-
ed the proposal. Weapons amnesties were
also relatively unpopular: only 19%
thought they were an effective solution.
We asked police officers a similar ques-
tion in open-ended fashion, leaving them
free to suggest what they thought would be
most effective. Their suggestions were var-
ied, but fell into five main categories:
deterrence, empowering police, education,
reducing supply and tackling root causes.
Deterrence policies centred on judicial
changes, advocating stronger, firmer pun-
ishment for use of firearms and knives.
Among those officers who suggested deter-
rence policies, longer prison sentences were
most often cited; 58% of respondents in
the sub-group and 35% of the entire group
supported tougher prison sentences. Other
policy suggestions included mandatory
term prison sentences (23%), clearer sen-
tencing (7%), capital punishment and/or
deportation (6%), better enforcement of
current laws (3%), more prisons (2%), and
financial deterrence (0.7%). 
The second category, empowering
police, produced several suggestions for
increasing the effectiveness of police in
combating gun and knife crime on the
frontline. The most popular suggestion
was more arms (by which they meant tasers
and other non-lethal weapons) for police;
37% of respondents within the subgroup
and 8% of the total supported the policy.
Other suggestions included more resources
for police (26% in the subgroup), more
stop-and-search powers (22% in the sub-
group), greater police intelligence (11% in
the subgroup), and incentives for inform-
ants (3.1% in the subgroup). 
Education was identified by some
frontline officers as an important preven-
tive measure. However, only 7% of
respondents identified increased aware-
ness in schools as a viable solution.
Educating parents was identified by only
0.6% of respondents. Again, prevention
programmes that are delivered through a
multi-agency approach may fly below the
radar of constables and sergeants.
Tackling perceived root causes like com-
puter games, drugs and alcohol were not
suggested often, each being mentioned
by 1, 0.7 and 0.2% of respondents resp -
ec tively. 
Reducing supply was also mentioned by
a small number of officers. Greater border
controls were suggested by 0.5% of
respondents and a complete ban on imita-
tion and deactivated firearms was suggest-
ed by 3%. 
The relatively low support among Police
Federation members for long-term policy
initiatives is most likely a reflection of the
tactical nature of their work. Police consta-
bles and sergeants want to see policies
enacted that have immediate results on the
street level. Initiatives that would not
deliver measurable results for 5 or more
years do not appeal to the police. It is
important that policymakers take on board
the concerns of frontline police, but that
there is an adequate balance between tacti-
cal and strategic policies.
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6
Youth Justice
System and Youth
Offender Teams
Summary
As previous research, statistics and anec-
dotal evidence have reported, violent
offenders are becoming ever younger. Any
attempt to cut violent crime must start
with a focus on youth justice. In an effort
to better understand the state of youth
crime, the following chapter looks at pri-
mary research gathered from the focal
point of the youth justice system: Youth
Offender Teams. Our structured inter-
views with Youth Offending Team man-
agers provide a national picture of the state
of frontline youth justice and an indication
of violent crime trends for young offend-
ers. The responses were as varied as the
YOTs themselves, with reports that violent
crime had increased, decreased and
remained stagnant in almost equal propor-
tion. The interviews were most useful for
understanding how YOTs work on a daily
basis, their shortcomings, limitations and
ideas for improving youth justice. Many
YOT managers felt they were not able to
implement prevention work due to
resource constraints.
The young offender survey gave the
research team a window into how young
offenders feel about gun and knife crime,
their experiences with illegal weapons and
their perceptions of public safety. The survey
revealed that pluralities of young offenders
believe that the police are unable to protect
them from violent crime; crime in general
has gone up in their area; and knife crime
has become more prevalent where they live. 
Youth Offending
According to a recent report by the Centre for
Crime and Justice Studies, Labour’s reforms
of the youth justice system have not had a
positive impact on the state of youth crime in
England and Wales. Solving violent crime
begins with solving youth crime because
males aged 10 to 25 are the most likely per-
petrators.153 Moreover, the most likely victims
of violent crime are males aged 16 to 24.154
Last year 27 teenagers were killed in London
in a wave of gang and youth violence but that
record figure is set to be surpassed.155 
Youth Justice System
Youth offending teams have been the main-
stay of youth justice in England and Wales
since the late 1990s. A YOT is a multi-
agency team (police, probation service, social
services, health and education services, as
well as other specialist workers like housing
officers and substance abuse counsellors) co-
ordinated by a local authority and overseen
by the Youth Justice Board. Each has a man-
ager who is responsible for co-ordinating the
work of the youth justice system within their
local authority. Every local authority in
England and Wales has a dedicated YOT.
YOTs incorporate representatives from a
wide range of services, allowing them to
respond to the needs of young people who
have offended, or are at risk of doing so, in
a variety of ways. Assessment is crucial in
curbing reoffending, as it identifies which
programme the young offender is most
likely to benefit from.
153 Tackling Violence Action
Plan, Home Office; see
www.homeoffice.gov.uk/docume
nts/violent-crime-action-plan-
08/violent-crime-action-
eia?view=Binary
154 Ibid
155 "School girl murdered", The
Daily Mail, 3rd June 2008; see
www.dailymail.co.uk/news/articl
e-1023708/Girl-14-latest-teenag-
er-die-vicious-stabbing.html 
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Development of YOTs
The principal aim of the youth justice sys-
tem is to curb reoffending. If a young
offender enters the criminal justice cycle,
the youth justice system’s primary goal is to
keep them from ever being in it again.
Section 37 of the Crime and Disorder Act
1998 outlines the purpose of the youth jus-
tice system as “preventing offending by chil-
dren and young people”. This is accom-
plished through the following actions:156
 the swift administration of justice so
that every young person accused of
breaking the law has the matter
resolved without delay; 
 confronting young offenders with the
consequences of their offending, for
themselves and their family, their vic-
tims and their community, and helping
them to develop a sense of personal
responsibility; 
 intervention which tackles the particu-
lar factors (personal, family, social, edu-
cational or health) that put the young
person at risk of offending and which
strengthens protective factors; 
 punishment proportionate to the seri-
ousness and persistence of offending; 
 encouraging reparation to victims by
young offenders; 
 reinforcing the responsibilities of parents.
The Act gave clarity of purpose to the youth
justice system and set the groundwork for
the creation of YOTs. In Section 40, the Act
creates a statutory obligation for local
authorities, in consultation with their part-
nership agencies, to create an annual youth
justice plan. The plan outlines the nature
and scale of youth crime in their area and
the programmes available to tackle it. The
Act requires the plan to cover how local
youth justice services are to be structured
and funded. This requirement eventually
gave rise to the youth offending team as
local authorities needed a body to co-ordi-
nate youth justice efforts across agencies.  
The work undertaken by YOTs is
explained in section 38 of the Crime and
Disorder Act 1998 and is set out in the
national standards for youth justice pro-
duced by the Youth Justice Board. First
and foremost, YOTs are responsible for
preventing young people from offending
in the first instance, through the co-ordi-
nation of a range of targeted programmes.
However, YOT workers told us that this
statutory obligation is not being carried
out as envisioned because they are often
too understaffed and burdened by case
loads to carry out prevention work. 
When young offenders are referred to a
YOT through the courts, the team is
responsible for carrying out a standardised
assessment using Asset (a structured assess-
ment tool produced by the Youth Justice
Board). Asset helps YOT workers to deter-
mine why the young person has offended,
what their family and lifestyle circum-
stances are, whether they have specific
mental health or drug and/or alcohol-relat-
ed problems, if they are engaged in learn-
ing and what level of risk they pose to
themselves and others.157
YOTs are also responsible for delivering
intervention programmes for those who
have received a final warning from the
police. These aim to tackle the causes of
the offending (as identified through Asset),
confront the consequences and carry out
some form of reparation. Young offenders
are referred through several different chan-
nels as outlined in the diagram below.
When a young offender is referred to a
YOT, he or she is given a supervising offi-
cer who must develop a plan to address the
offending behaviour and identify the fac-
tors associated with offending through
Asset. The supervising officer will make
use of colleagues from other agencies with
specialist knowledge as appropriate. The
plan must address education, training or
employment, any history of substance mis-
use, healthcare needs, parental or primary
carer involvement, work on offending
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156 Smith R, Youth Justice:
Ideas, Policy, Practice, Willan
Publishing, 2007 
157 Youth Justice Annual
Statistics 2005-06, Youth Justice
Board, 2006
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behaviour, work to address experience of
discrimination or any discriminatory atti-
tudes or behaviour and, if necessary, plans
to reduce risk of harm to himself or oth-
ers.158 Intervention may include anger
management and life skills, or parenting
courses for the young person’s carers. The
plan will also cover direct or indirect repa-
ration to the victims of the crime. 
YOTs are also required to provide a
supervising officer for those young people
receiving a custodial sentence (detention
and training orders/section 91 sentences),
who will work with the secure establish-
ment to draw up a training plan.159 As with
other interventions, the training pro-
gramme focuses on the factors that drive
young offenders’ behaviour and seeks to
address gaps in their education, mental
health and well-being, and housing needs. 
YOT Structure
There were a total of 18,013 people work-
ing for YOTs in England and Wales in
some capacity for the financial year 2005-
06.160 There were also over 450 vacant
posts. The average YOT in England and
Wales was staffed by 48 volunteers, 32 full-
time practitioners, 6 part-time practition-
ers, 12 seasonal workers, 10 administra-
tors, 6 managers, and 2 students/trainees.
The majority of staff were women (66%).
Income for YOTs is derived almost entirely
from local authority funding. In 2005-06 the
total core budget provided by statutory agen-
cies was £195 million.161  The Youth Justice
Board contributed an additional £50.4 mil-
lion or 20% of total YOT funding. (Further
funding provided by the YJB for targeted pro-
grammes, such as the intensive supervision
and surveillance programme, is not included
in the £50.4 million of core funding.) 
The chart below gives the average level
of sources of funding for YOTs for 2005-
06. Apart from funding from the YJB, all
other resources are from local budgets.
Since 2000-01, as Youth Offending
Teams were being rolled out across
England and Wales, spending on youth
justice has increased by 45% in real
terms.162 The total funding contributed by
statutory agencies, local authorities and
the Youth Justice Board was £648.5 mil-
lion for 2006-07. Of this, 64% was spent
on purchasing custodial places for chil-
dren. This amounts to more than ten
times the amount spent on prevention,
which accounts for only 5% of the YJB
budget.163
158 Connexions, Youth Justice
Board, 2001; see
www.connexions.gov.uk/partner
ships/publications/uploads/cp/C
onnex_Youth_Justice.pdf
159 Working Together and
Connexions, Youth Justice
Board, 2001 
160 Youth Justice Annual
Statistics 2005/06, Youth Justice
Board, 2006
161 Ibid
162 Solomon E and Garside R,
Ten Years of Labour’s Youth
Justice Reforms: an independent
audit, Centre for Crime and
Justice Studies, London, 2008
163 Ibid
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Figure 15: Total Partnership Funding for YOTs
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The State of Youth Crime
When the Government undertook youth
justice reforms in the Crime Reduction Act
1998, the Youth Justice Board established
two primary targets for reducing youth
crime. The first set of targets was built
around self-reporting of youth crime, as
measured by the annual MORI Youth
Survey of 11 to 16 year-olds in mainstream
education. The goal was to reduce self-
reported offending to below 26% by 2006.
According to a 2006 MORI Youth Survey
self-reported offending is 27%. 
Vehicle crime, burglary, and robbery are
the subject of the second set of targets. The
aim is to reduce the number of young people
who are “usually resident in the YOT’” and
who receive a substantive outcome for each
of the three offences.164 Unlike the self-report-
ed offending target, the YJB has met targets
on robbery, burglary, and vehicle crime,
although youth offending appears to be
increasing, as shown by the number of
offences resulting in a “disposal” (sentences
and pre-court decisions made by police). The
trend has been rising over the past four years
as the total number of offences has grown by
11.4% from 2002-03 to 2005-06.165, 166 The
chart below plots the rising trend. 
The most worrying trend associated
with rising youth offending, and the focus
of this report, is the rise in offences record-
ed as violence against the person. Although
the targets have been met on volume
crime, violent offending has risen signifi-
cantly from 2002 to 2006. For 2002-03,
violence against the person offences stood
at 35,000, rising to 54,661 in 2005-06.
The increase of violence over four years
from 2002 is over 50%.167
The increase in violent crime among
young offenders calls into question the tar-
gets on which the Youth Justice Board is
judged. The target culture that has plagued
police forces has permeated the youth jus-
tice system, as the most destructive crimes,
involving violence against the person, have
risen unabated.168
Structured Interviews
In the structured interviews, the majority
of respondents said that their YOT had
seen an increase in young offenders
involved in knife crime; 60% said that
there had not been an increase in gun
crime among young offenders; and 21%
said that gun crime has never been an issue
in their YOT. Of those not reporting an
increase in gun crime, 64% said it had
been an issue in their YOT, but that it had
not increased over the past five years and
36% said it had never been an issue.
Looking at the YOTs described as urban,
58% reported an increase in gun crime,
compared to only 7% of rural YOTs. 
The second question asked respondents
about trends in knife crime among young
offenders. Based on anecdotal evidence we
expected knife crime to be more common
than firearms offences. This was confirmed
in the interviews. The majority said that
their YOT had experienced an increase in
young offenders involved in knife crime.
61% of respondents reported an increase
in instances of knife crime among young
offenders; 35% reported no rise in knife
offending, while 4% said they did not
know if there had been an increase in knife
crime. 
The urban/rural divide was much more
interesting for the knife offences than for
firearms. As expected, urban YOTs reported
more increases in knife crime than rural ones,
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164 Youth Justice Annual
Statistics 2002/03, Youth Justice
Board, 2004
165 Youth Justice Annual
Statistics 2005/06, Youth Justice
Board, 2007
166 Solomon E and Garside R,
op cit 
167 Youth Justice Annual
Statistics 2005/06, Youth Justice
Board, 2007
168 Ibid
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disposal
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but the difference was not pronounced: 67%
of urban and 55% of rural YOTs reported an
increase in knife crime incidents among
young offenders. This suggests that the phe-
nomenon is spreading from urban centres to
less densely populated areas. 
YOT workers were also asked about
trends in gang-related offending, one of the
main drivers of youth violence and involve-
ment in gun and knife crime. A majority
felt that it had increased: 52% reported a
rise in gang offending. However, some
respondents were quick to stress that “group
offending” is often categorised as gang
offending. The distinction may not be easy
to make since gangs have become more
chaotic and leaderless. An offence that may
appear to be an instance of impulsive group
offending could indeed be a gang offence. 
Again, the urban/rural divide illustrates
the spread of gang culture from major urban
centres outwards to suburban and rural
areas. 58% of urban YOTs reported a rise in
gang-related offending, compared to 39% of
rural YOTs. But since this has traditionally
been confined to major urban centres, it was
surprising to see so many rural YOTs report
an increase. This could be the sign of a spill-
over effect. England and Wales are still fortu-
nate, in that gang culture has not yet reached
the level of US cities, but if prompt action is
not taken gang offending will continue to
grow in the areas where it has taken root. 
Almost all those YOTs that reported
knife crime was stable still considered it was
an issue. We asked respondents what rea-
sons young offenders give for carrying a
knife. The overwhelming majority (83%)
reported that young offenders carry knives
out of “fear and/or protection”. The remain-
ing 17% said that young offenders carry
knives for fashion or as a status symbol,
while a very small number said that some
young offenders do actually admit to carry-
ing a knife with the intent of using it. There
was no discernible difference between urban
and rural YOTs in reasons young offenders
gave for carrying a weapon. 
Funding for any government organisa-
tion is always a contentious issue and
YOTs are no different. Given that so
much of YOT funding goes into buying
custodial places for young offenders,
many workers feel there is little left over
for case work, and even less for preventive
measures. YOTs are not meant to exist as
ad hoc bodies that interact with youths
only once they have been referred by the
courts. On the contrary, they are designed
to curb both reoffending and first-time
offending through prevention pro-
grammes. (Section 38 of the Crime
Reduction Act 1998 makes it an obliga-
tion for YOTs to engage in prevention.)
Yet many respondents felt they did not
have the resources needed to run effective
prevention programmes. As a result of
under-funding, and target priorities,
YOTs are unable to fulfil the main reason
for their existence.  
The structured interview asked each
respondent whether or not they felt their
YOT was adequately resourced. The
majority of YOT workers felt that they
were not given the resources they required
to carry out all of their duties to the best of
their ability. 73% of interviewees said that
their YOT was not adequately resourced,
while 27% felt that their YOT was given
the resources and funding needed to per-
form as it should.  
The qualitative responses to the ques-
tion were extremely varied. Some YOTs
were perfectly happy with the funding they
received, while others felt that a lack of
funding kept them from meeting their
national targets. One said: “There has
never been enough funding, but now we
are facing cuts, and the first thing to go
will be our prevention work.”169 Other
respondents felt that they were given
enough, but that a little more would go a
long way. “We could always use and do
more, if we had the resources. We are given
adequate [resources], yes, but it’s not gen-
erous or great.”170
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YOT manager, March 2008
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YOT manager, March 2008
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The urban/rural divide appeared again
when looking at perceptions of resources.
92% of urban YOT workers felt that they
were not given an adequate level of fund-
ing compared with 58% of rural workers.
The reasons for discontent among YOT
workers regarding funding are varied. The
most commonly cited frustration was the
impact on prevention work. Interviewees
also identified the short-term nature of
grants from the YJB or central govern-
ment. Others suggested ring-fenced fund-
ing for YOTs as a possible solution.
Because funding for YOTs comes from
both local council budgets and a national
level grant, there are significant variations
in funding for individual YOTs. 
Solutions from practitioners
The structured interviews were intended to
gain insights from those on the frontline of
youth justice who are charged with the task
of cutting offending and reoffending. We
asked YOT workers what they would do to
make their team more effective in curbing
gun and knife crime. Several key reforms
emerged that would improve the effective-
ness of YOTs and affect the amount of vio-
lent crime committed by young offenders. 
YOT reforms revolved primarily around
funding. Because of the discrepancies in
YOT funding, one respondent argued that
a national funding formula (perhaps simi-
lar to the one used for the policing grant)
would be an effective tool for supplement-
ing the budgets of YOTs that are most in
need. 92% of YOT workers in urban areas
feel that they are under-resourced, which is
likely to be a result of local authority budg-
ets already being stretched to fund other
public services. By establishing a national
funding formula, those YOTs that are least
well resourced would have an opportunity
to deliver better services. 
Combating the target culture that
weighs down much of the criminal justice
system in England and Wales has been a
mainstay of Policy Exchange reform argu-
ments. The inability to reconcile targets
and prevention efforts was identified by
several interviewees. YJB targets are based
on self-reports of offending and statistics
on court disposals for burglary, robbery
and vehicle crime; they have yet to incor-
porate measurements for any prevention
efforts. As a result, targets tend to skew
YOT priorities. Even though team man-
agers recognise the benefits of prevention
work in reducing violent youth offending,
the current performance regime does not
encourage it. Given the constraints of both
funding and performance targets, it is dif-
ficult for YOT managers to balance pre-
vention work with their case loads. Several
respondents felt that greater partnership
with, and more work from, the charitable
sector could close the gap in prevention
programmes offered, although there was
not much detail on how this would look in
reality. 
Finally, a number of interviewees said
that not enough was done to spread  best
practice between YOTs. One also thought
that the outcomes of prevention pro-
grammes had not been sufficiently evaluat-
ed. There is no lack of research coming
from central government agencies, but
there is obviously a problem with dissemi-
nating this information to practitioners. 
Young Offenders’ Survey
The YOT interviews were effectively ran-
dom: we contacted all 155 YOTs in
England and Wales, and our sample com-
prises a self-selecting group who agreed to
participate. In a similar way, the survey
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“ Respondents were asked if they felt the police were
able to protect them from violent crime. Only 25% felt that
the police were capable of doing so ”
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administered to young offenders was ran-
domly selected, based on 16 YOTs that
were willing to distribute it. However, as
we were warned by YOT managers
responses were difficult to get and a total of
eight YOTs sent back responses.
The survey distributed to young
offenders asked 12 multiple choice ques-
tions and two questions on demograph-
ics. The multiple choice questions were
designed to discover how often young
people may carry a weapon, come in con-
tact with one and have one used against
them. The survey also inquired about
young offenders’ attitudes towards police,
their perceptions of safety and their
thoughts on crime trends in their area.
The respondents had an average age of 15
years 6 months, and the majority (60%)
were white-British. The youngest was 9
years-old and the oldest 18. 
The first question asked if respondents
felt they needed to carry a weapon to feel
safe. A small majority (52%) said that they
did not feel they had to carry a weapon to
feel safe; 27% said they did not know; and
21% said they did feel the need to carry a
weapon. Of those who said either they
needed to carry a weapon or did not know,
65% had been previously threatened with a
knife. Strangely, 36% of respondents who
said they did not need to carry a weapon to
feel safe also said they had previously been
threatened at knife point. The survey results
reflect findings in previous research.171
Respondents were asked if they felt the
police were able to protect them from vio-
lent crime. Only 25% felt that the police
were capable of doing so. Another 25%
said they did not know. Half (50%) said
they did not believe the police were able to
protect them from violent crime in their
area. 67% of respondents who felt the
police were unable to protect them had
previously been threatened with a knife.
The majority of respondents were white, of
British background, but only 50% of
respondents who felt unprotected by the
police were white, meaning respondents
who felt unprotected by police were dis-
proportionately non-white.
In terms of perceptions of crime, the
majority (59%) felt that crime had risen
over the last two years in their area. 19%
said they did not believe crime had risen in
their area, while 22% did not know if
crime had risen in their area. 
When asked specifically about trends in
knife crime, respondents were less than pos-
itive. A plurality (40%) of young offenders
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Violence: If we are not active in
prevention efforts, who will be?”,
Arch Pediatr Adolesc Med, vol
152, 1998, pp 527-530
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Figure 17: “The police cannot protect me from violent crime”
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felt that knife crime had gone up in their
area over the past two years; 29% of respon-
dents said they did not know, and 31% dis-
agreed with the idea of gun crime increasing
over the last two years. Of the respondents
reporting a rise in knife crime, 56% had
previously been threatened with a knife. 
The survey also asked whether respon-
dents felt gun crime had increased in their
area over the past two years. The results for
this question were far more encouraging
than for knife crime, though the discrepan-
cy reveals how much more common the use
of knives than guns is among young offend-
ers. 13% said they believed knife crime had
become worse in their area over the past two
years. The plurality of respondents (44%)
felt that gun crime had not worsened in
their area and 42% did not know. 
Despite only 13% of respondents
believing that there is more gun crime in
their area, half (50%) said they know
someone who has carried a gun at some
time; 7% of respondents said they did not
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Figure 18: “Crime has gone up in my area in the last two years”
Figure 19: “There is more knife crime in my area than two years ago”
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know if they had known someone who had
carried a gun; 44% said no, they had not
known someone who had carried a gun.
The fact that a small majority of randomly
selected young offenders have had contact
with someone in possession of a gun is a
frightening figure.
The survey asked young offenders if they
had ever been threatened with a knife; 50%
said they had been. Given that half  of sur-
vey respondents had been victims of knife
crimes themselves, it is not surprising that
they have negative attitudes towards the
police service’s ability to protect them or feel
the need to arm themselves to feel safe. 
Statistics
To support our findings from both the
structured interviews with YOT workers
and the young offender surveys, we looked
at figures and statistics for the 16 YOTs
that agreed to administer the youth survey.
The figures, reported by the Youth Justice
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Figure 21: Total Offences for Violence Against the Person
Figure 20: “Has anyone ever used or threatened to use a knife against you?”
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Board, corroborate YOT workers’ assess-
ment of trends in gun and knife crime
among youths. 
The rural/urban distribution of the
YOTs participating in our survey was
biased towards urban teams; 12 of the 16
were categorised as urban. However, the
YOTs are a random reflection of areas
across the country, covering London, the
Midlands, the North, Wales and the South
West. 
The YJB data for the 16 YOTs reveals a
definite trend upwards in youth offenders
committing acts of violent crime.
Unfortunately the data does not explicitly
record gun and knife crime – all violent
offences are put under the same category as
“violence against the person”. 
Lessons
The information garnered from the YOT
worker interviews, young offender surveys
and Youth Justice Board statistics indicate
a trend towards more violent offending
being committed by young people. Youth
Offender Teams are the organisations best
placed to combat this trend, so it is impor-
tant that they are empowered to do so.
YOT workers are dedicated and talented
people working under difficult conditions;
a shift in priorities, targets and resources
could bring long-term improvements. 
One of the most important aspects of
prevention is that different agencies should
share the responsibility of risk manage-
ment; the police are rarely the first state
agency to discover that someone is at risk
of offending.172 YOTs are well placed to be
a focal point through their engagement
with schools – not always easy as some
schools are more co-operative than others.
The Government needs a nationally
planned or cohesive approach to the pre-
vention of violence among young people,
including funding earmarked for preven-
tion-only programmes and performance
targets based on best practice. 
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172 Interview with Chief
Superintendent Dave Keller,
Manchester, April 2008
Figure 22: Offences for Violence Against the Person Recorded by YOT
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7
Manchester case study
Summary
Gang shootings caused four deaths and
18 injuries in Manchester alone last year
and cost Greater Manchester Police £6
million.173 Despite setbacks, the Greater
Manchester Police (GMP) has worked
with other agencies to take robust action
to tackle gangs and gun crime. In partic-
ular they have built partnerships with
other agencies, improved community
relations and increased community confi-
dence in the police service. The struc-
tures that sustain gang culture and activ-
ity have shifted significantly in the past
decade; from organised crime syndicates
to more fluid, autonomous and chaotic
groups. Gun and knife crime takes a mas-
sive toll on society, from deaths and seri-
ous injuries to the psychological impact
on individuals, families and communi-
ties. High levels of violent crime can also
have serious implications for the eco-
nomic infrastructure, community cohe-
sion and confidence. This case study
explores the work of the XCalibre task-
force and describes the life of a gang
member.
Background
The research team spent several days on
a site visit focusing on the GMP
Metropolitan Basic Command Unit,
which includes the Moss Side area of
Manchester, a huge contributor both to
volume crime and firearms discharges.174
Both the Metropolitan BCU and neigh-
bouring Trafford BCU are receiving
extra funding under the Government’s
tackling gangs action programme
(TGAP), which was launched in
September 2007 after the murder of 11-
50
173 Interview with Ralph
Corrigan, MMAGS, Manchester,
April 2008
174  Interview with Chief
Superintendent Dave Keller,
Manchester, April 2008
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Figure 23: Firearms discharges in GMP and Met. division
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year-old Rhys Jones in a Croxteth
carpark.175
The Metropolitan BCU has an ethni-
cally diverse population: 130 different
languages are spoken in the area. Many of
the 145,000 residents live in large hous-
ing estates. There are also 70,000 stu-
dents. Unemployment is high and so is
crime. About a third of firearms dis-
charges in the Greater Manchester Police
district take place in this small area. Moss
Side also has a history of gang activity,
which is now spreading into parts of Old
Trafford and Stretford.176 Historically,
there have been two primary contributors
to the gang conflict, the Gooch and
Doddington gangs. To a lesser extent, a
third gang, the Longsight Crew have been
active for many years. In the past decade
the number of gangs has increased expo-
nentially. Today there are more than a
hundred splinter gangs, all of which claim
their own identity but still align them-
selves to one of the three main groups. 
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176 Interview with Detective
Inspector Darren Shepton,
Manchester, April 2008
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Xcalibre 
Greater Manchester Police established
Operation Xcalibre (also known as the
Xcalibre Task force or XTF) in September
2006 to tackle gun crime among gangs.
The team, comprising a detective superin-
tendent, a detective inspector, two ser-
geants, 14 constables and an intelligence
officer, concentrates on intelligence,
enforcement and prevention.
Street-level intelligence gathering, espe-
cially in the Moss Side area, continues to be
the best method of identifying and tracking
the movements of gang members and this is
the focus of XTF work. One XTF officer
said: “We are able to see them in their ter-
ritory, associating with other gang mem-
bers, carrying out incursions into opposing
gang territory and ultimately arrest them
for offences.”177 They can establish who are
the most active gang members, who are
taking the biggest risks and who are most
likely to commit violent offences.178
Older gang members are far more dis-
creet than younger ones, perhaps because
they are more feared and respected and
thus have less to prove or, as one officer
suggested, “perhaps they have just learnt
from experience”179 Younger gang mem-
bers, however, will frequently travel in
large groups into opposition territory,
knowing that they risk violent reprisals. As
another officer told us: “…the need for
excitement and to prove themselves is very
strong”.180
Xcalibre also receives information from:
 Agencies: such as the Manchester multi-
agency gang strategy team; 
 Prisons: inmates on arrival will declare
gang allegiances to ensure that they are
not put at risk on a wing with members
of an opposing gang;
 Housing officers: Xcalibre will be con-
tacted by housing officers if a gang
member requests a move away from
areas he is at risk, having declared
him/herself as involved in a gang; 
 Schools: school-based liaison officers
and the Manchester multi-agency
gang strategy (MMAGS) often receive
information regarding tensions in
schools and problems between gang
members;
 Probation officers: requesting and shar-
ing information about clients will high-
light the allegiances given to them by
their clients.
Principles of Combating Violent
Gang Crime
Much of Xcalibre’s early success is rooted
in the three-pronged strategy of intelli-
gence, enforcement and prevention. The
combination of intelligence and enforce-
ment is the best short to medium-term
strategy the police have for stamping out
gang violence. The long-term strategy is
prevention work, carried out primarily
through improving police-community
relations and empowering affected com-
munities. 
Intelligence and Surveillance 
A solid foundation of police intelligence is
essential to restricting both the demand
and the supply sides of gun crime. The
Greater Manchester Police approach com-
bines the street-level work of Xcalibre with
Level 2 and 3 operations run by its armed
crime unit. Covert surveillance is expensive
in terms of manpower and bureaucratic
barriers make Level 2 surveillance more
difficult than it should be to gather vital
intelligence. For XTF officers to track
intelligence on the 20 most wanted offend-
ers will add about £13,000 a month to
normal policing costs. Initial government
funding under TGAP for Greater
Manchester Police was £140,000 (supple-
mented in January 2008 by £50,000 for
community confidence and trust building
activities); the first £85,000 was chan-
nelled to wide reaching community opera-
tions and the remaining £55,000 to covert
activity.
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Enforcement 
Automatic Number Plate Recognition
Operation
The TGAP funding was used to run a
series of high-profile, automated number
plate recognition operations on the Old
Trafford and Moss Side border in
December and March 2008. This opera-
tion cost approximately £5,000 and led to
two arrests, 46 stop-and-searches and 33
offences being reported. 
Policing at Schools
Secondary schools in areas with high-levels
of gang activity (Manchester Academy,
Stretford High and Trinity High) were iden-
tified as vulnerable since the majority of
children in the area attend one or the other
of them. The “policing at schools” initiative
was primarily a public reassurance exercise
but it also deterred gang members from
hanging around school premises and
improved police relationships with teach-
ers.181 Since then the schools have invited
XTF officers in to discuss gang issues, which
some had previously been reluctant to do
for fear of negative publicity. The cost of
this operation was £2,300.182
High visibility patrols
Neighbourhood policing delivers a visible
police presence and is vital to building
community confidence. £I0,000 was allo-
cated for increased street patrols in the
evenings along the Moss Side and Old
Trafford border (an area within the
Metropolitan BCU). These additional
patrols led to three arrests, and garnered 68
intelligence reports from officers interact-
ing with the public, from October 2007 to
March 2008.183
Targeting Offenders 
There were two fatal gang shootings in
Manchester in January 2008. Operation
Cougar, launched the following month,
deployed plain-clothes Xcalibre officers to
act as spotters collecting real-time intelli-
gence, and a contingent from the tactical
aid unit to act as an enforcement team.184
In addition to the increased police pres-
ence at street level, the force aeroplane was
deployed to monitor gang activity covertly.
Finally, to support officers on the ground,
two police dogs and four mounted officers
were deployed daily. The operation has run
for nearly three months between the hours
of 1600 and 0400.185 In total there have
been 24 deployments. When Operation
Cougar was first launched, the tension
between rival gangs was so high that the
whole of the Greater Manchester Police
was on official alert. There has been a sharp
reduction in firearms discharges by gangs
in the Metropolitan BCU since it began. 
Such has been the success of Operation
Cougar in preventing further shootings –
and indeed murders – that considerably
more TGAP funding than originally pro-
jected has been used in this area (£5,000).
This has been supplemented by force
funding. Operation Cougar resulted in the
serving of five acceptable behaviour con-
tracts (ABCs), seven ASBOs, 26 letters to
persons “at risk” (see below), 26 referrals to
MMAGS and one juvenile removed from
custody.186
One of the main purposes of Operation
Cougar is to identify juveniles at risk from
gang activity. They, and their parents, are
issued with a letter of concern, which high-
lights the risks of the individual’s behav-
iour and involvement in gang activity.187
Police then explain the details and services
offered under MMAGS and children’s
services. If juveniles persist in endangering
themselves, they may be removed from the
street and taken home. As a last resort,
police may take a juvenile into police pro-
tection and to a place of safety (see case
study: Boy A). Such action may seem dras-
tic, but it has been praised by both parents
and partnership agencies.
The practice follows the “gold strategy”
championed by Chief Superintendent
Dave Keller, commander of the
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181 Unpublished TGAP Report,
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182 Number of arrests: 1; num-
ber of stop/searches: 28; num-
ber of hours deployed 80.
183 Unpublished TGAP Report,
Manchester Police, 2008
184 Interview with Chief
Superintendent Dave Keller,
Manchester, April 2008
185 Unpublished TGAP Report,
Manchester: Manchester Police,
2008 
186 Ibid
187 Unpublished TGAP Report,
Manchester: Manchester Police,
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Metropolitan BCU. This proactively iden-
tifies young persons who by their behav-
iour or location at time of day (for exam-
ple, out on the street in the early hours)
may risk being the victim of gun crime.
The police aim to remove such individuals
to “a place of safety” by returning them
direct to their homes and families or into
the care of social services (Emergency
Police Protection Order Proceedings). The
legal foundation for this strategy is Article
2 of the Human Rights Act (Right to
Life).188 The fact that police are now will-
ing to go to such lengths has not escaped
young gang members. The word has spread
that the police will “lock you up” for being
openly involved in a gang.
Level 2 Covert Activity 
Police efforts to disrupt the supply side of
firearms centre on surveillance and eventu-
al disruption of illegal dealers. However,
surveillance operations require a great deal
of manpower and often compete for
resources with other priorities, such as ter-
rorism.
The armed crime unit (ACU), part of
the serious and organised crime group
within GMP, is charged with investigating
and disrupting illegal arms dealers. The
ACU’s efforts are long-term, ongoing oper-
ations. The unit targets firearms supplies,
and Level 2 organised crime and gang
criminality with support from the force
intelligence bureau and the Serious
Organised Crime Agency. Their covert
operations are subject to regular review,
ensuring that coverage and intelligence
flows are appropriate and targeted.189
From the start of the TGAP initiative in
September 2007 up to March 2008, the
unit’s surveillance and covert action direct-
ly linked to gang activity has resulted in 31
arrests, the recovery of 19 firearms and
2,307 rounds of ammunition and the dis-
ruption of 77 firearms transfers.
Enforcement
Building on police intelligence work,
enforcement uses legislation to restrict the
movements and activities of gang mem-
bers. As well as the measures described
under Operation Cougar, police try to use
Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs).
However, these are not always appropriate
for typical gang behaviour and courts have
been reluctant to impose them. According
to XTF officers, gang members spend most
of their time indoors where they do not
indulge in any obvious antisocial behav-
iour. However, once on the street, one text
message could mobilise an entire gang,
sparking a conflict between rival factions,
but this is not what is normally understood
by antisocial behaviour.190
Multi-agency work 
The Manchester multi-agency gang strate-
gy (MMAGS), which was introduced in
2001, remains the only crime and disorder
reduction partnership (CDRP) in England
and Wales that works solely on gangs and
their use of firearms. It defines a gang as “a
group of three or more people who have a
distinct identity (eg a name or
badge/emblem), which commits general
criminal or anti-social behaviour as part of
that identity, and uses (or is reasonably sus-
pected of using) firearms or the threat of
firearms in the commission of offences”. A
gang member is someone who has identi-
fied himself through “verbal statements,
tattoos, graffiti etc, and this is corroborat-
ed by police, partner agencies or commu-
nity intelligence”. 
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Direct interventions include one-on-
one work with gang members, providing
them with an exit strategy if they are will-
ing. It runs a series of school days educat-
ing young people on the risks of gangs and
guns. Follow-up sessions are aimed at those
deemed most at risk. Its workload is a
heavy one, with over 80 active cases at
present. In the three months from
February to May 2008 it had direct con-
tact with 130 individuals, mostly under 18
years. Only one client has been convicted
for a firearms offence while with the pro-
gramme. There were 23 gang homicides in
the five years before MMAGS was set up
(1997 to October 2001) compared to 20
in the seven and half years after (October
2001 to April 2008). 
Operation Eagle
One of the first actions under the
Government’s TGAP was Operation Eagle
on 28th November 2007: 105 firearms
search warrants were executed; 21 searches
of gang members’ homes carried out; 84
searches of sheds/gardens and wasteland
surrounding gang addresses; and 25 people
were arrested, nine for firearms offences
and four firearms seizures. At the same
time Greater Manchester Police held a day
of action (there were similar operations in
other forces throughout the country).191
Many different agencies were involved,
including MMAGS, Manchester and
Trafford councils, housing associations,
social services, community groups and
independent advisory groups working in
partnership with GMP; 250 police staff
took part in the operation.192 The
Metropolitan BCU distributed 1,500
leaflets to addresses affected by gun crime.
The leaflets explained how to access sup-
port services and gave details of confiden-
tial police hot lines, as well as information
on witness support. The local council
removed gang graffiti. Community feed-
back was an integral part of the operation,
particularly in areas where community-
police dialogue had been lacking. The
effort made by police to engage better with
the community was evident after a large-
scale police search for firearms ended with
residents applauding police as they left the
area.193
Community Engagement
Much of Manchester’s success in combat-
ing gang violence stems from concerted
efforts toward better community engage-
ment. The Metropolitan division benefits
greatly from some excellent community
leaders and the police have harnessed
their abilities through the development of
the Greater Manchester Police independ-
ent advisory group (IAG), which deals
with gun crime and the impact of police
operations. The IAG is consulted during
policing operations and its members act
as observers. It comprises 12 volunteers
who meet officers on a regular basis to
discuss policing issues and offer a com-
munity perspective. The group advises on
how best to respond to certain incidents;
assists with the development and delivery
of training; helps with festivals and
events; scrutinises new policies and acts as
a link between the community and the
police.194
Evident in the Metropolitan division’s
community outreach work for prevention
and communicating new policies, is a
desire to display sensitivity to community
concerns. When police increased the use of
stop-and-search in the Moss Side area, the
police produced a DVD explaining why
and how it worked. This was supported by
special training for police officers by a
member of the IAG on stop-and-search
procedure; complaints and mediation pro-
cedures; a media marketing strategy and a
series of community events.
Project Reclaim
The project was established with £3,600 of
TGAP funding and organised by Urbis –
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an exhibition centre based in Manchester
that focuses on city living. It also had the
support of a number of corporate spon-
sors.195 The aim of the project was to build
civic responsibility and active citizenship
among young men. The participants
worked collectively to define eight princi-
ples that they considered to be acceptable
behaviour for all Moss Side residents and
that became the basis for the Moss Side
Manifesto; 3,000 copies were printed and
distributed throughout the area by its
authors. Part of the project involved 45
young black men from Moss Side, identi-
fied by police as being vulnerable to gang
activity, attending a four-day conference
with black and minority ethnic speakers
who emphasised that you can make posi-
tive choices regardless of where you live.196 
Dodge the Bullet Campaign
The campaign was launched in November
2007 by a local pressure group, Mothers
Against Violence, and advises youths who are
either mixed up in gang culture, in danger of
becoming so, or who have relatives/friends
who are. It is run by young people local to the
Moss Side area; it received £500 to transport
youths to the launch at the City of Manchester
Stadium and £3,000 for the project.
Witness confidence initiative
GMP has had a additional DVD produced
outlining the witness protection and other
special measures that are available to allow
witnesses to provide evidence in this difficult
area. The DVD emphasises the ability of courts
to receive anonymous evidence, inclu ding the
use of voice distortion. Practical demonstra-
tions will be given at community presentations.
Lessons
After spending time on site at GMP’s
Metropolitan Division, the research team
identified a number of problems that hinder
police efforts to tackle violent gang crime.
As Policy Exchange has previously argued,
the current structure of performance targets
for the police skews priorities. The current
performance targets are aimed primarily at
volume crime rather than high-impact
crimes like a shooting. This diverts resources
from gangs and guns because “what gets
measured gets done”. There are also no tar-
gets to reflect successful efforts at preven-
tion: if the police are able to stamp out an
escalation of gang violence through
increased patrols, this will not be reflected in
any targets or key performance indicators.
This problem was also identified for YOTs.
There need to be sweeping changes to tar-
gets for the whole criminal justice system to
reflect the importance of prevention work. 
There are also issues around funding. A
great deal of supplementary funding, for
example TGAP funding, is one-off or short
term. Effective preventive measures cannot
be carried out with piecemeal short-term
funding. Planning long-term prevention
requires long-term funding. 
The Metropolitan BCU has benefited
immensely from better community engage-
ment. Chief Superintendent Dave Keller
has made excellent use of a strong IAG, and
built community confidence in the police
service with their help. Engaging the com-
munity begins with empowering those best
placed within it to lead. By doing exactly
that, the Metropolitan BCU has established
a better relationship between police and the
community and increased social capital in
the area.
Better support for intelligence officers is
crucial to curbing the supply of illegal
firearms in cities. Intelligence officers in
the GMP armed crime unit highlighted
the difficulty of dealing with cross-border
flows of firearms and the time taken to
obtain intelligence streams, such as phone
tap warrants, which must be signed for
personally by the Home Secretary. The
subsequent delay is unacceptable because
police miss opportunities to seize on
firearms smugglers and arms dealers,
allowing more guns onto the streets.  
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Responsibility for risk management
should be shared by all local authority
agencies. By default, most of this responsi-
bility is shouldered by the police, but other
agencies are also likely to identify at-risk
youths. As a last resort, police need the
freedom and flexibility to use civil injunc-
tions, ASBOs and even the Human Rights
Act to protect young people who pose a
risk to themselves and others. 
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Boy A: a case study
Boy A, born on 30th July 1992,  lived on Moss Side with his mother and younger brother. He first
came to the attention of local police aged 13 in October 2005 following an allegation of criminal
damage at a local school. Shortly afterwards he was arrested in connection with 18 separate offences,
predominantly street robberies carried out with friends, and was convicted of three of them. 
In 2006 he was identified as a member of a splinter gang called M.S.B, which has attracted the
attention of XTF officers because of their young age and rates of offending. Boy A is believed to have
been present when a 14-year-old friend of his was shot dead in 2006.
In May 2007 he was shot in the leg during a gang drive-by shooting. He relished the attention his
wound brought him and refused to assist the police in any way with their investigation. To take him
away from the gang lifestyle and protect his life, MMAGS arranged for Boy A to be rehoused in
another area with his mother and brother, but he soon reappeared in Moss Side. 
Boy A was then put into a placement for children who have been excluded from school, but this
education was sporadic and away from mainstream. Because he had to travel through rival gang ter-
ritory, a taxi was paid for daily to transport him safely to his place of education. He was also taken
away on breaks by agencies working with gang members, but on one of these he got into a fight with
another boy and was sent home.
In June 2007 he was arrested for threatening to shoot a police community support officer. His bail con-
ditions excluded him from areas of gang activity and set a curfew. The following month he was formally
registered as a child at risk given his mother’s inability to rein in his dangerous behaviour. Although there
is no doubt that he broke the conditions of his bail many times, the fact that the police were prepared to
enforce them ensured that he kept a relatively low profile and didn’t put himself on the frontline.
In August 2007 he committed a section 18 assault when he set a dog upon a girl, and he was later
arrested while attempting to intimidate the victim as she was giving evidence against him. In January
2008, he was convicted and given a 12-month supervision order. Unfortunately the bail exclusion
and curfew were not part of the order and the police lost the only means of enforcement that had
worked in their efforts to safeguard him. Boy A began to reappear on Moss Side associating with
active gang members and joining gang attacks. 
On 15th February 2008, Xcalibre officers saw him in a park, which was notorious for gun inci-
dents and the scene of a recent murder, at a large gathering of gang members. For his own protection
the officers took him into custody under an emergency police protection order and contacted social
services. (His mother had already agreed to such a course of action.) Eventually it was decided that a
place of safety was at home with mother, where he was returned. This pattern was repeated in April.
Boy A has consistently refused to accept any offers of help to move away from the gang lifestyle.
He often returns to Moss Side and frequents situations that will attract gang attacks with firearms.
The local police and XTF fully intend to continue using emergency police protection orders to pro-
tect him, though Boy A himself sees them as a means of police enforcement rather than for his own
protection. Police and partner agencies are currently attempting to find evidence of recent antisocial
behaviour; if successful they may be able to obtain an ASBO that would exclude him from gang areas
and prohibit him from associating with gang members. 
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8
Birmingham Case
Study
Summary
Violent gang crime in Birmingham has
evolved from a citywide struggle for con-
trol of the narcotics trade, to a fragmented
and volatile landscape of more than a hun-
dred splinter groups willing to engage in
violent acts with no apparent motive. The
city’s method of dealing with this challenge
has centred on a multi-agency approach to
the management of offenders and gang
member exit strategy (relocating and sup-
porting reformed gang members), a medi-
ation programme for warring gangs and a
system for documenting and targeting the
members most at risk. The police have
used civil injunctions under Section 222 of
the Local Government Act 1972 to stop
known gang members from operating in
areas where they are likely to offend. 
Background
We spent several days on site with mem-
bers of West Midlands police based in
Birmingham. Gang activity in areas of
Birmingham poses a constant challenge to
the West Midlands police force. It was on
their patch in Aston that Leitia
Shakespeare and Charlene Ellis died in the
crossfire of a shoot-out on New Year’s Eve
2002. 
Birmingham’s gangs 
Birmingham’s experience of gangs has
grown substantially since the 1970s and
1980s. At the beginning two gangs domi-
nated the city’s underworld: Burger Bar
based in Handsworth and Johnson Crew in
Aston and New Town. They had a stable
form of organisation, and a great deal of
their activity revolved around the drugs
trade. But as gang culture spread among
greater numbers of youths in Birmingham,
its organisational structure began to unravel.
Evidence from police in Birmingham
reveals a challenging landscape. There is a
localised problem of guns and gangs in the
city – reflecting trends in England and
Wales. Although crime involving firearms
has been reduced, the problem is not going
away: 72% of residents are likely to report
that gangs are a problem in their area.197 A
significant proportion of crime is commit-
ted by young people and violent offenders
appear to be getting younger. In 2008, the
typical age is between 16 and 20, consider-
ably younger than 15 years ago.198 (The
peak age of victims is 20 to 24.) Most vio-
lent crime is concentrated in four wards:
Lozells and East Handsworth, Soho, Aston
and Sparkbrook and it is expensive – for
example, “juvenile wounding cost the city’s
economy in excess of £50m per annum.”199
Illicit drugs, especially cocaine, are the pri-
mary source of income for gang members.
The relationship between gangs and the
class A drugs trade in Birmingham is far
stronger than in Manchester, where gang
members mostly deal in class C drugs. As
gangs look to expand and protect drug
trading, territory becomes very important
and violence is often used to protect it. 
However, drug dealing is only one of
many causes behind gang violence. And
violence over territory is not always about
58
197 See www.homeoffice.gov.
uk/violent-crime-action-plan-
18020
198 Interview with Detective
Inspector Paul Etchells, April,
2008
199 Unpublished Birmingham
Police Strategy Document, West
Midlands Police, 2008
Going Ballistic HDS  11/7/08  10:10  Page 58
protecting drug trade. Drug dealing still
underpins the criminal economy and the
non availability of legal conflict resolution
means that firearms offer ultimate protec-
tion and empowerment.200 Gangs by their
nature are extremely territorial. Some-
times the wrong person crossing the
wrong street is enough to start a serious
violent conflict between two gangs. The
diagram below shows a map of northwest
Birmingham and the areas controlled by
different gangs.
Gun Supply
In Birmingham one to two guns are dis-
charged on average every day.201 Although
the number of firearms homicides in
Birmingham has been falling since 2002-
03, the number of firearms discharges has
not fallen in the same way. (One of the
most popular explanations for the drop in
homicides is the poor quality of illegal
handguns used.) Birmingham police have
recovered a number of decommissioned
but reactivated weapons and converted
replicas. These are easy to get hold of and
police believe they are the most prevalent
among gang members.202 Other firearms
include Russian-made Baikal handguns,
9mm submachine guns and a small num-
ber of MAC-10 machine pistols.
Birmingham’s Approach to Gangs
Besides enforcement, the approach of West
Midlands police is based on intervention,
harm reduction, offender management
and real co-operation with the local Crime
and Disorder Reduction Partnership
(CDRP).
According to Chief Superintendent
Tom Coughlin, there are between 400
and 500 persons actively involved in
gang violence across the city. To combat
the problem on such a scale,
Birmingham police co-ordinate a multi-
agency group – the Birmingham
Reducing Gang Violence or BRGV –
comprising the police, Birmingham City
Council, Birmingham Safer Partnership
and community groups. It aims to
reduce harm in the short term through
mediation, intervention and enforce-
ment, and in the long term through
offender management education, and
building community capacity to con-
tribute to crime reduction.
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Figure 26: Gang Territory in Birmingham
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Multi-agency Work
The strategic approach taken by the part-
nership has three key elements:
 Offender management (police led);
 Building community resilience and
engagement (city council led);
 Independent advisory group – over-
sight and scrutiny (community led).
Civil Injunctions and Restriction
Orders
BRGV has developed swiftly over the
past 12 months and focuses on produc-
ing tangible results that build communi-
ty confidence in the police, as well as
social capital within the community. Its
recent success is the result of using both
the criminal and civil justice systems,
through the use of ASBOs and civil
injunctions. 
West Midlands police have been effective-
ly applying existing legislation for public
protection, through Section 222 of the Local
Government Act 1972. As written, a local
council can use section 222 to obtain a
county court order to prohibit a person from
continuing to cause a public nuisance. The
wording of the Act is somewhat ambiguous
and this has allowed West Midland police to
use it creatively in the interest of public safe-
ty. The Act provides that: 
Where a local authority considers it
expedient for the promotion or protection
of the interests of the inhabitants of the
area, it may prosecute. To be successful, it
must be able to prove that:203
 The behaviour of the person in ques-
tion materially affects residents in the
area;
 The reasonable comfort and conven-
ience of life of a class of Her Majesty’s
subjects is negatively impacted;
 The area affected by the nuisance
behaviour can be described as “the
neighbourhood”; 
 There are sufficient numbers of peo-
ple within the local community
affected by the nuisance behaviour to
constitute a “class of the public”. It is
not necessary to prove that every
member of the class has been affect-
ed: a representative cross-section will
be enough; 
 It is within the proper action of a local
authority to put an end to all public
nuisances to protect and promote the
interests of the inhabitants of their
area.
West Midlands police were able to use
Section 222 to exclude dangerous indi-
viduals from certain areas so that they
could no longer exert influence, trade
drugs or intimidate residents there. It
allowed them to control dangerous gang
members by enforcing non-association or
restraining orders, exclusion zones around
certain areas (barring known gang mem-
bers from the area in which their gang
operates) and specific exclusions (buses or
parks). 
A similar strategy is built around the
enforcement of ASBOs. If the police are
able to identify and target a high-risk gang
member, and are able to successfully pros-
ecute them with an ASBO, then they can
establish exclusion zones and seriously
limit the individual’s ability to pursue gang
activity.
ASBOs were introduced under Section
1 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998
and first used in 1999. The use of civil
law procedures and the broad scope of
authority granted to courts to impose
restrictions and conditions on individuals
were necessary and welcomed by local
authorities. After receiving an ASBO,
some gang members in Birmingham have
entered gang exit programmes.
According to Chief Superintendent Tom
Coughlin, one gang member who
received an ASBO later told police, “This
ASBO saved my life”.204
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The Police Reform Act 2002 contains
five important changes regarding
ASBOs:205
 Courts may decide that an ASBO will
be valid throughout the country; 
 It will be possible to apply for interim
ASBOs; 
 Registered social landlords and the
British Transport Police will be able to
apply for ASBOs; 
 It will be possible for a court to impose
an order at the same time as passing
sentence for a criminal conviction; 
 County courts will be able to impose
orders under certain circumstances. 
ASBOs are another example of police cre-
atively using the law to combat escalating
gang related violence. However, existing
legislation is simply not fit for purpose.
The use of both section 222 and ASBOs is
a testament to the ingenuity and resource-
fulness of top police officers, but both face
legal challenges. In January 2008, a high
court judge ruled that use of section 222
was unlawful and consequently stripped
the Birmingham police of a valuable tool
against gang violence. Since this ruling,
gang violence has risen sharply.206 Clearly,
the police require new powers to defuse
imminently violent situations.
Intelligence-led Policing and Risk
Management
Rather than targeting gangs as a whole,
police in the West Midlands, most specifi-
cally in Birmingham, focus their efforts on
a well-documented, intelligence-led system
of targeting dangerous individuals known
to be a risk to themselves and others.
Intelligence officers in the F3 operational
command unit of West Midlands Police
have developed a rigorous system or “risk
matrix” for doing so. It means they can be
sure that they are focusing resources on the
most dangerous and most at-risk gang
members in their jurisdiction. Moreover,
the risk matrix gives an element of
accountability and oversight. Should any
questions be raised over the methods used,
Birmingham police can produce clear doc-
umentation outlining the reasons behind
any action taken. 
The first section of the risk matrix is
based on intelligence about illegal use of
firearms. It covers intelligence only and is
not cross-referenced against offences or
charges. This section also includes intelli-
gence from police observations, forensic
evidence, etc, indicating that the subject
has access to firearms but has not yet been
arrested or charged for offences. 
The second section consists of informa-
tion on possible drugs offences. Again, this
covers intelligence only and is not cross-
referenced against offences or charges.
However, it does include arrests for
offences where the subject has been bailed
from a police station for further enquiries.
As revenue from drug sales fuels a great
deal of gang activity, this intelligence is
extremely relevant to identifying the most
active gang members.
Geography is a significant factor in pat-
terns of gang crime. Gangs are extremely
territorial in nature; they are known to
dominate the areas in which they are active
through witness intimidation, threatening
violence or simply through peer pressure.
When gang members commit criminal
offences, they are most likely to do so in a
specific area. As a result, geographic infor-
mation on offending is the third part of the
risk matrix. This covers intelligence about
offences that are committed by the subject,
and where they are committed.
The fourth section includes instances of
previous arrests or public disruptions,
whether the subject is wanted for offences
by the police, is on police or court bail, or
on licence from prison. Additionally, it
assesses whether the subject appears to
enjoy an expensive lifestyle but with no
source of documented, legal income.
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Finally, if the subject is currently serving
a custodial sentence, then intelligence
about activities in prison are incorporated
into the risk matrix. It is important that
both police and probation services keep
close tabs on any intelligence coming out
of prison. Gang activity is known to per-
meate prison culture. 
After taking accounting of these various
intelligence streams, each subject receives a
risk rating: red, amber or green. At present,
Birmingham police have identified approx-
imately 10 category red individuals, 20-25
amber and more than 30 green. The main
purpose of the matrix is to identify which
gang members are the most dangerous,
based on available intelligence. West
Midlands Police were the first force to
develop a system to track and document
the specific targeting of dangerous individ-
uals and remain the sole operators of such
a system.
Surveillance
Crime in England and Wales is often clas-
sified on Levels 1, 2 or 3. Level 1 deals with
local volume crime such as burglary, crim-
inal damage and/or assault. Level 2 crime
is that which crosses police force bound-
aries, and usually involves serious offences
such as murder, armed robbery and/or
organised crime. Level 3 crime is serious
crime that crosses international bound-
aries, such as organised crime networks
and terrorism. 
Gun crime is extremely difficult to elim-
inate for many reasons. Chief among them
is the fact that it is pervasive in all three
levels of crime. Police must deal simultane-
ously with both the demand and supply
side of gun crime, as they strive towards
harm reduction. Although gun trafficking
belongs in Levels 2 and 3, the conse-
quences of illegal gun trafficking affect
Level 1 crime as well. Combating gun traf-
ficking requires national border control,
but the movement and sales of firearms are
dealt with by regional forces and even by
local Basic Command Units. 
The most effective weapon against
firearm trafficking is surveillance. Police
surveillance can be used against both gun
traffickers and potential firearms offenders.
However, there are procedural barriers to
both that make it difficult for police to use
surveillance effectively. Interviews with
West Midlands police intelligence officers
revealed that there is not enough surveil-
lance capacity to deal with illegal firearms
supply.207 Moreover, as found by Man -
chester police, there are significant delays
in getting phone taps, which need to be
signed off by the Home Secretary. 
On a local level, when the police have
gathered enough evidence to place a target-
ed individual under surveillance for possi-
ble firearms crimes, there is an overriding
protocol that must be observed: if there is
any suspicion that a subject under surveil-
lance may be in possession of a firearm,
then an entire armed response vehicle team
(ARV) needs to be present. This policy
drains resources as there are a limited num-
ber of available ARVs. It should be amend-
ed to have an ARV team on stand-by or to
have one firearms officer accompany a sur-
veillance team. Surveillance policy needs to
be more flexible in its approach to dealing
with firearms crime. 
Offender Management
West Midlands Police, and specifically
police in Birmingham, have made signifi-
cant strides in improving offender manage-
ment for known gang members.
Birmingham’s gang exit programme puts a
heavy emphasis on bringing offenders who
have finished serving a custodial sentence
out of gangs. Leaving a gang sounds simple
– just walk away from the area and refuse
to associate with gang members – but in
practice it is fraught with difficulty and
often requires support from a number of
agencies, as well as relocation to another
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city. To support gang offenders who want a
way out of their former lifestyle,
Birmingham has developed a programme
adapted from the multi-agency public pro-
tection arrangements (MAPPA). 
MAPPA was created by the Criminal
Justice and Court Services Act 2000 – orig-
inally to protect the public when a violent
or sex offender was released back into soci-
ety. In 2005 the National Offender
Management Service (NOMS) realised that
there was a gap in the management of gang
members who wanted to leave the gangster
life behind on release. NOMS worked with
police in Birmingham to tailor the MAPPA
system for them as well. The programme
offers housing, counselling and employ-
ment support. Although still in a very early
stage, the response has been positive and
recidivism rates for clients are significantly
lower than for non-members. 
Mediation
The third pillar of Birmingham’s gang strat-
egy that has proved both innovative and
successful is the independent mediation
provided by the West Midlands Mediation
and Transformation Service (WMMTS),
brainchild of two former Birmingham
police officers who have extensive experi-
ence dealing with gang crime in the city.
The impact of the mediation service can
best be illustrated by an overview of gang
violence during the past five years.
In 2002 alone, there were 27 gang mur-
ders costing police roughly £37 million. In
the past four years combined, there have
been 11 gang murders costing just over
£15 million.208 According to Chief
Superintendent Coughlin, the number of
murders is falling, though injuries are
increasing.
Development of the Service
The WMMTS was established in 2004, in
response to an escalating and chaotic wave
of firearms offences across the West
Midlands. The majority of these offences
involved either young men being shot or
young men shooting their peers and rivals. 
Following a series of high-profile shoot-
ings, Birmingham found itself the subject
of unsavoury headlines and an unwel-
comed media spotlight that led to a defen-
sive posture and some much needed think-
ing on how to approach gun crime and
gang violence. The West Midlands media-
tion and transformation service was one
response. It found inspiration in the prin-
ciples of the Good Friday Agreement in
Northern Ireland, as it sought to unite dis-
parate and fractured groups that were
locked in a cycle of violence. 
The mediation process first brings disaf-
fected parties together to talk – though this
is almost always done through an interme-
diary. Once they have established contact,
the service looks to work through and
beyond conflict, towards a structural break
with cycles of violence. Essentially, the
mediation process is driving towards two
distinct phases of social cohesion. The first
phase is making peace between the two
groups. This entails framing the dispute,
identifying the grievance, establishing rela-
tionships and building the confidence to
take risks. The second phase is keeping the
peace, which entails working with parties to
remove normal barriers to co-operation and
disarmament. It also entails creative think-
ing and introducing structural relationship
changes – leading to transformation. 
The mediation service built upon this
twin structure to access communities and
groups that were aggrieved but lacked the
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of their time indoors where they do not indulge in any
obvious antisocial behaviour. However, once on the street,
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confidence to resolve matters. Early efforts
from the mediation service were met with
success. These consolidated efforts were
then used on a number of occasions to
identify and resolve pockets of conflict
across Birmingham and the West
Midlands. 
One of the most important characteris-
tics of the mediation service is its neutral-
ity and independence from the police.
Although there is a degree of information
sharing, it is mostly a one-way stream:
from the police to the mediation service.
WMMTS maintains a good standing
within communities, so much so that
community leaders seek it out to assist in
defusing tensions within and between
gangs. It has become a de facto agent of
cohesion, recognised by community lead-
ers, local politicians, public authorities
and even key individuals connected to
gangs. 
What the Mediation Service Does
The mediation programme in the West
Midlands currently has the most effective
harm reduction potential in the country.
The WMMTS delivers four main services.
The first is information dissemination, for
example giving communities early warning
of mounting tension between two conflict-
ing gangs. The second is bringing people
together and promoting creative social
thinking. This allows the programme to
deliver on its third service – facilitating the
community, police and even gangs them-
selves to act to quell rising potential for
violence between groups.  Finally, it helps
to keep the peace through monitoring and
the transformation of gang attitudes and
relationships. 
In theory, the WMMTS is a near perfect
model for curbing gang violence, but there
are several issues that hinder its perform-
ance. The mediation is voluntary so the
opposing parties must be willing to come
forward. A growing number of acts of vio-
lent retribution occur within gangs. For
example, a younger gang member might
disrespect an “elder”. According to West
Midlands police intelligence officers, many
violent offences involving gangs are seem-
ingly motiveless and not susceptible to
mediation. 
The annual budget for the WMMTS is
roughly £500,000, but this sum is quickly
depleted by salaries. Moreover, the short-
term nature of its funding is not conducive
to a programme with long-term goals. 
Staff turnover is another issue. The
WMMTS employs a senior management
team of 15 mediators who work at full
stretch at all times. Because they are highly
trained, they make attractive candidates for
other schemes and are easily poached.
There is also the risk of mediators suffering
from burnout following an intense round
of mediation between gangs when lives
may be at risk.
WMMTS has to meet the challenge of
achieving short-term results while keeping
a focus on long-term sustainable gains.
Balancing expectations can be difficult:
some community stakeholders have unre-
alistic expectations of the service. It is
important to define what the programme
can and cannot do. 
At times there has been a failure to
respond quickly enough to clients’ requests
for help in exiting the gang and gun cul-
ture. If gang members come forward ask-
ing for assistance through an exit pro-
gramme and that help is not delivered, it
can lead to serious damage to the pro-
gramme’s credibility within the wider com-
munity.   
Lessons
Birmingham’s efforts to reduce gang vio-
lence boast three innovative approaches
that have shown a great deal of promise.
However, there is little evidence that its
success has been spread as best practice to
other police forces that face the challenges
of gang violence.  
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The city’s success in curbing gun, knife
and gang crime is built on its commitment
to intelligence-led targeting of dangerous
gang members, the use of mediation serv-
ices in the face of conflict escalation, a
multi-agency gang exit strategy and cre-
ative use of Section 222 of the Local
Government Act 1972 and Anti-Social
Behaviour Orders. 
Birmingham has had success in reducing
gang violence by co-ordinating multi-
agency work, offender management, medi-
ation, gang exit strategies and effective use
of civil injunctions. However, the removal
of Section 222 from the police tool kit has
been a devastating blow. Although
Birmingham has made strides to combat
gang violence through all of the above
mentioned initiatives, the cornerstone of
its strategy was harm reduction through
the use of civil injunctions. Since their use
was overturned in the high court, gang vio-
lence has surged.209
The loss of Section 222 should be a cat-
alyst for new legislation that gives police
and local authorities clear power to use
civil injunctions against offenders posing
an imminent threat to others in the com-
munity. As the Birmingham and Man -
chester case studies have shown, effective
management of violent offending is only
possible through a comprehensive
approach that encompasses both long-term
strategies aimed at tackling the causes of
violent crime, and short-term tactics aimed
at immediate harm reduction. If police do
not have every opportunity to execute both
short-term and long-term measures, vio-
lent crime will remain embedded within
our society.
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Conclusion
This research makes no claim to be an all
embracing analysis of the problem of gun
and knife crime. We have adopted a bot-
tom-up approach and have looked at the
perceptions and experience of those closest
to the reality – the public and frontline
practitioners; we have taken account of
current policy and practice; and we have
identified areas where policy intervention
could be improved. These recomendations
will be developed and fully costed for the
second book in this series, to be published
in Autumn 2008.
Principles
Based on our research, four clear principles
have emerged that provide the context for
the policy recommendations that follow.
These principles are:
1. The long-term trends with respect to both
gun and knife represent a real and devel-
oping problem in society
We have commented in depth on the
nature and extent of the problem, and the
context and limitations of the British
Crime Survey and recorded crime data.
This data can be and is used to present a
partial and misleading picture. The BCS is
often cited to demonstrate a fall in overall
violence (31% since 1997) for example;
however, its figures exclude offences by
young people under 16. The authors wel-
come the plan to pilot the inclusion of
under 16s in the BCS 
Minor variations in recorded crime from
one year to another are sometimes used to
present a picture of an improving situa-
tion, which is misleading. The Home
Office Statistical Bulletin, Homicides,
Firearms Offences and Intimate Violence
2006-07, will show that gun offences
declined by 14% from 2006 to 2007.
However, in the year to December 2007
there were provisionally 9,967 firearms
offences – an increase of 4% compared
with the 12 months ending December
2006. A further dimension is presented by
the most recently available detailed analysis
of figures. The 2005-06 figures show a rise
over the previous year of 23% (from 78 to
96) in the number of serious (firearms)
injuries in the 10-19 year-old age range.
Young people are increasingly involved in
impulsive firearms crime – 42% of
firearms crime involved criminal damage,
54% involved violence and robbery. 
Knife crime was not separately identi-
fied in the annual data until April 2007.
However, the long-term trend in murder
using a knife is worrying, notwithstand-
ing a decrease in 2005-06. Long-term
trends are more significant – as any
informed follower of the stock market
will testify. 
2. These issues cannot be addressed by a
crime control approach alone – a compre-
hensive, cross-departmental and long-
term preventive strategy that addresses the
underlying causes as well as the symptoms
is also required
We have outlined in our analysis what we
have described as an epidemiological
approach: the effectiveness or otherwise of
criminal laws on public health vis-à-vis
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injury and death rates. In so doing we
have drawn on research that sets out the
risk factors involved, including poor edu-
cational achievement, erratic or harsh
parental discipline, parental conflict or
separation, low socioeconomc status,
delinquent or violent peers and disorgan-
ised neighbourhoods. 
3. Serious policy responses need appropriate
prioritisation and resources over the long
term
We have identified the problematic impact
of performance management and the
development, from April 2008, of the
assessments of policing and the communi-
ty safety regime. The principle promoted
here is that police and community safety
priorities should be locally derived and
locally relevant within the broad context of
national targets. 
The youth offender team research
undertaken for this study demonstrated
how prevention, even when enshrined in
statute, gets lost when practitioners are
faced with the day-to-day reality of serving
the criminal justice system with limited
capacity and resources. The benefits of the
TGAP initiative in Manchester were brief
in terms of central funding support. In the
absence of continuing central government
funding the National Ballistics Intelligence
Programme, for example, had to be paid
for from local police force budgets. 
4. There is a need to recognise and build on
effective and promising existing initiatives
We have commented favourably on some
of the emerging best practice in the case
examples reviewed in Manchester (through
TGAP), and in Birmingham (mediation).
At a more strategic level, the Violent
Crime Strategy 2008-11 seeks to address
these issues in a cross-departmental way
with central direction and impetus from a
ministerial action group.
Recommendations
Information and funding 
 Recommendation 1
Relevant agencies should agree to
share information especially about
individuals posing a risk of violence,
individuals at risk and potentially dan-
gerous locations. This sharing should
be required by law in order to over-
come differences in workplace culture
and ethics.
 Recommendation 2
Central government should collate and
publish recorded crime figures much
faster than it does now, ideally every
quarter, so that emerging trends can be
identified promptly.
 Recommendation 3
The Government should fund the
National Ballistics Intelligence System
and National Firearms Intelligence Cell
centrally to ensure their future and
continuity. 
 Recommendation 4
The National Ballistics Intelligence
System should be extended to include
Scotland and Northern Ireland to
ensure a more comprehensive and
effective intelligence framework. 
 Recommendation 5
The performance targets of the police
and other agencies should include pre-
vention of gun and knife crime. They
should reflect long-term prevention
and management of risk as well as short
term responses. 
 Recommendation 6
Departmental and agency resources
should be allocated, and ring-fenced,
over the long term to enable the
effective delivery of a preventive
strategy. 
www.policyexchange.org.uk •   67
Conclusion
Going Ballistic HDS  11/7/08  10:10  Page 67
Supply
 Recommendation 7 
The UK Border Agency, supported by
Revenue and Customs, should do more
to detect the importation of firearms
and component parts, ammunition
and related material.
 Recomendation 8
A new procedure should be designed so
that phone taps can be authorised more
quickly.
 Recommendation 9
Deactivated weapons should be classi-
fied as imitation firearms under the
Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006,
and their ownership should be prohib-
ited without a firearms certificate 
 Recommendation 10 
Intelligence-led operations under
Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and
Public Order Act 1994, which allows
police to stop and search without sus-
picion in anticipation of violence, and
screening equipment, should be
implemented consistently. The scope
of Section 60 should be extended to
cover incidents of recent serious vio-
lence. 
Demand
 Recommendation 11 
Develop an early intervention strategy
based around the Sure Start pro-
gramme. An effective response to gun
and knife crime needs to address the
wider social and economic causes of
interpersonal violence. Early interven-
tion for children at risk, aged 0 to 5, is
the best hope of having a long term
effect on violent crime trends. 
 Recommendation 12
An education strategy should be devel-
oped to address issues such as the fear
and perceived need for self-protection
that prompts many young people to
carry weapons; and guidance should be
given to schools and parents on gangs,
guns, and knives. 
 Recommendation 13
Ensure that all agencies have access to
examples of best practice in multi-
agency intervention. 
 Recommendation 14
Subject to independent evaluation, dis-
seminate the Birmingham mediation
approach with respect to gangs as
“good practice” through the National
Police Improvement Agency and other
relevant agencies. 
 Recomendation 15
Implement a system for spreading best
practice, especially in risk management,
across youth offender teams. 
 Recommendation 16
Develop community engagement and
overt community action. 
 Recommendation 17
Develop the risk matrix approach for
indentifying individuals who pose a
risk of violent crime.
Criminal Justice
 Recommendation 18
The legislation affecting both knife and
gun crime should be subject to a thor-
oughgoing review with the object of
simplification and clarification. 
 Recommendation 19
Mandatory jail sentences with respect
to gun and knife crime offending
should be applied as intended.
 Recommendation 20
Civil law remedies, such as ASBOs,
should be developed further to underpin
prevention and management of risk. 
Going Ballistic
68
Going Ballistic HDS  11/7/08  10:10  Page 68
 Recommendation 21
Contact with the criminal justice sys-
tem for those involved in gang, knife
and gun crime should be used as an
opportunity to tackle the causes of
offending, engage other services and
provide intensive continuing support
for young people on release from cus-
tody.
 Recommendation 22
Witness protection and support schemes
should be improved given the danger of the
criminality involved in gun and knife crime. 
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Glossary
ACPO: Association of Chief Police Officers
is a professional police association repre-
senting members of chief officer teams:
chief constables, deputy chief constables
and assistant chief constables.
ACU: Armed Crime Unit is part of the
serious and organised crime group in
police forces and is charged with investi-
gating and disrupting illegal arms sales.
APACS: Assessment of Community Safety
indicators are used by Central Government
(to track performance in local areas and
include a focus on serious crime and pro-
tection, reflecting public service agree-
ments (PSAs) agreed between government
departments and the treasury
ARVs: Armed Response Vehicle is the term
generally used to define a patrolling vehicle
which contains firearms, usually in a secure
armoury. The vehicle is crewed by at least
two police officers suitably trained in the
use of weapons and equipment to be carried
in the vehicle, which provides immediate
armed response to appropriate incidents.
BCS: British Crime Survey measures the
amount of crime in England and Wales by
asking people about crimes they have expe-
rienced in the last year. The BCS includes
crimes which are not reported to the police,
serving as an alternative to police records.
BCU: Basic Command Unit is the main
operating unit of police forces. There are
228 of them in England and Wales. A force
will divide its territorial area into a number
of BCUs, each having its own complement
of officers and staff
CDRP: Crime and disorder reduction
partnership is an alliance of organisations,
including police, fire service, NHS, local
authority departments, legal agencies and
voluntary agencies, that is required to gen-
erate strategies for its area.
Community safety partnerships: partner-
ships between local agencies to identify
and respond to crime and disorder within
their local authority area.
COT: Chief officer team a team of officers
at the force level, comprising chief consta-
ble, deputy chief constable, and assistant
chief constables.
CPS: Crown Prosecution Service is
responsible for prosecuting criminal cases.
Crime Levels: Level 1: local, high-volume
crime characterized by antisocial behav-
iour, vandalism and petty theft. Level 2:
more serious crime such as murder or
organised crime. Level 2 crime often oper-
ates across police force borders. Level 3:
terrorism and international crime that
transcends national borders.
CSR: Comprehensive Spending Review
is a governmental process in the United
Kingdom carried out by HM Treasury to
set three-year departmental expenditure
limits and, through public service agree-
ments, defines the improvements that the
public can expect from these resources.
HMIC: Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of
Constabulary examines and improves the
efficiency of the police service in England
and Wales.
IAG: Police Independent Advisory Group
comprises members of the community
who provide the police with independent
advice on a range of issues, including
developing the plans and policies which
will shape the way communities are
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policed in the future. The IAG also liaise
between police officials and the communi-
ty, keeping a two-way stream of communi-
cation open.
LAAs: Local Area Agreements set out the
priorities for a local area agreed between cen-
tral government and a local area (the local
authority and Local Strategic Partnership)
and other key partners at the local level.
MAPPA: Multi Agency Public Protection
Arrangements are exist to deal with the
risks that are presented by some released
offenders who are thought to pose a risk to
society or to themselves.
MMAGS: The Manchester Multi-Agency
Gang Strategy (MMAGS), which was
introduced in 2001, remains the UK's only
Crime and Disorder Reduction
Partnership (CDRP) team working solely
to tackle the problems of street gangs
involved in firearms use.
NABIS: The National Ballistics
Intelligence Programme deliver a new data-
base providing, for the first time, a nation-
al database for all recovered firearms and
ballistic material such as complete rounds
of ammunition, shell cases and projectiles.
The database will also link those ballistics
items to tactical intelligence recorded by
the Police forces and other UK Law
enforcement agencies.
NCRS: National Crime Recording Stan-
dards was adopted by all police forces in
England and Wales in April 2002 (some
had adopted the Standard earlier) in an
effort to improve the consistency of police
recording and to better reflect the demands
made on the police by victims of crime.
NIM: National Intelligence Model is an
information-based deployment system and
cornerstone for the management of law
enforcement operations in England and
Wales. NIM identifies patterns of crime
and promotes a co-operative approach to
policing, which requires the participation
of other agencies and bodies.
NPI: Neighbourhood policing initiative is
a programme aimed at putting more police
officers out on patrol to increase police vis-
ibility and tackle quality-of-life issues that
often cause distress, such as graffiti, rowdy
neighbours, vandalism, offroad motorcy-
cling, speeding and littering.
NOMS: National Offender Management
Service was created in 2004 and is the sys-
tem through which correctional services
are commissioned and provided.
NPIA: National Policing Improvement
Agency is new agency created to support
self-improvement across the police service
and to drive forward programmes outlined
in the national community safety plan.
OCJS:Offending, Crime and Justice Survey
is a nationally representative, longitudinal,
self-report survey which asks young people
in England and Wales about their attitudes
towards and experiences of offending.
PA: Police Authority is an independent body
with responsibility for the appointment of
chief officers, managing finance and moni-
toring the performance of the force.
PCSOs: Police community support offi-
cers are civilian members of staff who
wear a police-style uniform. Their main
functions are to provide a highly visible
police presence in public areas and to deal
with low-level nuisance and antisocial
behaviour.
Police Federation: The Police Federation
of England and Wales is the representative
body to which all police officers up to and
including the rank of Chief Inspector
belong.
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PPAF: Police Performance Assessment
Framework is an initiative led by the Home
Office, with the support of Her Majesty’s
Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC), the
Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO)
and the Association of Police Authorities
(APA), which establishes  policing targets
throughout England and Wales.
PSA: Public Service Agreements are per-
formance commitments agreed between
government departments and the treasury
on a national departmental level.
TGAP: Tackling Gangs Action Prog ra -
mme which the Home Secretary launched
in September as the focus of renewed
action to tackle gun crime and serious vio-
lence amongst young people. The Tackling
Gangs Action Programme is overseen by a
central Ministerial Taskforce on guns and
gangs, chaired by the Home Secretary.
WMMTS: West Midlands Mediation
and Transformation Service is an inde-
pendent non-profit service that works
with Birmingham police to mediate
between different gangs when conflicts
escalate.  The programme is based on the
Northern Ireland model of conflict medi-
ation.
Xcalibre: Is the dedicated police task force
created to gather intelligence and combat
gang related gun crime in Manchester.  
YOT: Youth Offending Teams exist in
every local authority in England and
Wales. They comprise representatives
from the police, probation service, social
services, health, education, drugs and
alcohol misuse and housing officers.
YOTs are responsible for young offender
management and preventing youth
offending.
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Murders involving knives and firearms never fail to grab the
headlines, yet they are relatively rare. Gun crime, for example,
represents only 0.4% of all recorded crime in England and
Wales. The public are often sceptical, however, when they read
figures such as this – and they have reason to be so. The
evidence collected for this report suggests that chaotic, street-
level firearms offences, often associated with young people,
have risen.
The research team, led by former Assistant Chief Constable Dr
Bob Golding, have built a report around primary research taken
from interviews and surveys with police constables and
sergeants, Youth Offending Team Managers, young offenders,
public polling and case studies in Manchester and Birmingham.
The report shows that the nature of the threat from gangs, guns
and knives is changing, and the Government must change its
approach if communities are to stem the tide of youth violence.
The research findings support four primary arguments: that
official crime figures do not reflect the experiences of many
communities in England and Wales; that information and
intelligence sharing between agencies is lacking; that early
intervention and prevention work needs to be targeted and
expanded and that the relevant legislation governing gun and
knife crime is a mess.
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